

Evolution

(1939-1940) Quest. spec. de vie de exam.
le prob. figure de l'évolution

18-3 Ch. 25

1) Questions de universi sub status motus existenti

(5 pp. dactylog.)
eu latin

2) De l'appétit de la matière - (3 pp. dacty. eu franç.)

3) S. Th. Commentarium in Phys. Aristotelis, liber I, lectio XI.
"Tria Rerum naturalium principia esse..."

(4 pp. mimeo)
eu latin

4) Copie d'un article sur l'évolution (1 p. dactyl.)

QUAESTIONES DE UNIVERSO SUB STATU

MOTUS EXISTENTI

11

Quid sit universus sub statu motus existens a Divo Thoma
exponitur Q. Disp. de Potentia, q. v, a. 9, c.

Cum motus ex ipsa sua ratione repugnet ne possit ~~non~~ finis,
eo quod motus est in aliud tendens, unde non habet rationem finis,
sed magis ejus quod est ad finem (ibid., a. 5, c.), quaeritur ~~quis~~
quid sit omnium mobilium finis, et quomodo in hunc finem ~~ordinantur~~,
seu quatenus sit causa finalis universi in quantum universus sub
statu motus existit.

Hujus quaestionis solutio tota est in natura causalitatis
firis et in relatione appetitus ad appetibile.

Nostra hujus problematis solutio philosophica
breviter exponitur apud ~~Mr~~ H. Grenier, Coursus Philosophiae,
Vol. I, pp. 367 et sq., et hic longius declarabitur. ~~Quae~~
~~exponitur~~ Cum autem haec solutio, quae jam a Patre A.
Gardeil O.P. (1859-1931) quantum ad substantiam et
etiam a P. Sertillanges, ~~proposita~~ proposita est, cum thesi
scientifica in genere concordat, et multis recentioribus
(multi saltem numerice) impugnetur, quam impugnationem
in altissimis theologiae locis fundari contendunt,
quaedam hic prudentiae causa breviter praenotanda sunt.

1. Supervacaneum non est notare hanc quaestionem
difficillimam esse, propter multas distinctiones
faciendas quantum ad ipsa prolegomena, praesertim inter
ea quae nobis de hac re fide ~~revelantur~~ revelantur et
ipsum problema in quantum alio et alio modo pertinet
ad diversas disciplinas, ad sacram scilicet theologiam,
(quam theologiam ut in cursu methodologiae vidimus a fide
distinguendam), ad philosophiam et ad scientias experimenta-
les. Quae distinctiones numquam fere ab auctoribus factae
sunt, sed supponuntur. Harum distinctionum difficultatem
nec suspicantur. Et in hoc jacet maxima illa disputationis
difficultas de qua fuse Aristoteles in Topicis.

2. Notandum est, quod cum istis auctoribus et in
theologia loquentibus ~~plurimum~~ plurimum nonnisi verba
habeamus communia et nec hanc difficultatem suspicantur.
Et ex hoc patet utilitas eorum quae habet Aristoteles de
secundo instrumento dialecticae, scil. distinctio per
quam explicatur quot modis res dicatur. & Cujus instrumenti
necessitas eo magis apparet quod hi auctores eam ignorant.
V.g. actus et potentia, vel quod magis est, ens et non-ens,
apud thomistas et apud sequaces Vasquezii, Molinae, et
Suarez, nonnisi nomina habent communia. Quomodo igitur
ad easdem conclusiones perveniri posset, nisi ipsae res
omnino relativae essent ut sophistae docebant? Cum autem
numerus sequentium ~~praedictos~~ praedictos scriptores
longe ~~thomistarum~~ thomistarum numerum superet,
~~contradictionum~~ de multitudine contradicentium
mirandum non est. Nec nomen thomismi commune habemus.

2

Quod ad praesentem rem attinet, de ipsa evolutionis nominis significatione aequivocatur.

3. Quamvis in philosophia ut scientia est auctoritas nulla sit, quia ~~maxime in philosophia ut scientia est auctoritas nulla sit, quia~~ tamen difficile est nobis scire an sciamus vel non, ut dicunt Aristoteles et Angelicus in Primo Posteriorum, catholico in hac re magna cum prudentia procedendum est. Quantum ad me attinet, si auctoritas Sanctae Ecclesiae positionem quam nunc defendimus vel immediate vel mediate ~~condemnamus~~ rejiciendam esse declararet, absque ulla tergiversatione ejus deditio mihi me dederem.

quod

4. Saepe saepius dicitur/positio nostra vel similis saltem imprudens est. Quod facile dicitur si positio nostra non intelligitur, et si ipsa principia non admittuntur, quod constat. Atqui nullum invocamus principium quod apud Aristotelem et divum Thomam non invenitur. Sed auctores ~~arguunt contra conclusionem, noluntque ipsa principia considerare.~~ neglectis principiis, arguunt contra conclusionem, noluntque ipsa principia considerare.

5. Item, saltem in praxi, multi ~~in~~ in theologia loquentes, plures theologiae locos rejiciunt, ut sunt philosophia et scientiae experimentales. Constat enim modernis in theologia loquentes magis magisque philosophiam ~~negligunt~~ negligere, et certissimas quaestiones magna cum levitate considerare. Hoc eo magis quod isti ~~sapientis~~ sapientis nomen sibi vindicant. ~~Non sufficit de omnibus judicare: oportet enim ut hoc judicium sapiens sit. Quomodo autem sapienter de illis judicare possumus quae totaliter ignoramus? Quomodo sapiens appellari potest qui non solum~~ ~~quid sint scientiae experimentales et qualia et quibus rationibus adferuntur, sed et quid~~ ~~philosophia et qualia philosophica superbe ignorant?~~ Quod si talis esset sapientia, nihil ea facilius: ~~esset enim quaedam qualitas casu fortunaque indita, virtute qua quilibet de quocunque praesertim ignorato judicare posset. Verum est quod sapiens non debet omnia scire, sed scire omnino ea de quibus judicat et in quantum judicat.~~

6. Afferre hodie consuetum est Sanctae nostrae Ecclesiae Patres unanimiter contra nostram sententiam locutos esse. Sed ut postea ostendetur, ipsis Patribus fuse citatis, omnino distinguendum est inter hanc de Patribus loquendi modernam consuetudinem quae manifeste fundatur in hoc quod ~~unus auctor alterum modernum transcribit~~ ~~omnes in theologia loquentes abusive theologi vocantur,~~ et ipsum Patrum consensum qui totus contra Verbum Dei propriae mentis pigritiae alligantes ~~revertendus est, ita ut istorum modernorum sententia saltem periculosissima sit. Istorum auctorum argumenti pondus semper jacet in his quae Patres non dicunt, ac si de iis de quibus nihil dixerunt nihil amplius dici posset.~~

que

ut conclusiones

7. Notandum etiam quod plures modernorum ~~theologorum~~ in theologia loquentium Vasquezium et Cartesium sequuntur, sive explicitè sive implicitè, theologiam ut veram scientiam negando, ejusque necessitatem. Vel ita sacram theologiam concipiunt ut conclusionem in quantum conclusionem validam non admittunt, sed solummodo in quantum conclusio identificari potest cum aliquo alio principio immediate ex fide deprompto. Quo modo procedunt ut in scientiis experimentalibus, quae ex principio positum ipsum principium deducunt. Talis conceptio theologiae mere dialectica est, non proprie scientifica. Et ideo false supponunt quod nostrae conclusiones ut validae sint in aliquo theologiae loco explicitè ~~inveniendae~~ ~~esse~~ ~~et~~ arroganter quaerunt ut ~~textus~~ nps textus vel Patrum vel Ecclesiae doctorum vel declarationum ~~adferamus~~ adferamus qui cum istis conclusionibus ~~identificari~~ identificari possent. Et hoc stultissimum est.

egregie

8. Scientiarum experimentalium et methodum et rationes ~~gloriosae~~ ignorantes, quamvis concedant in ipsis divi Thomae operibus distinguendum esse inter ea quae proprie scientifica ~~sunt~~ sint et quae scientiam experimentalis sui temporis innixa, isti auctores et loquentes omnino incapaces sunt distinguendi in ipsis divi Thomae ~~operibus~~ ~~argumentis~~ argumentis ea quae scientifice constant ab eis quae in experientia sui temporis fundantur. Non vident quousque Angelicus in altissimis suis tractibus copiose scientia experimentalis sui temporis usus est. Si circa has ~~quaestiones~~ quaestiones apud ~~theologos~~ loquentes in theologia tam grandis sterilitas extat, nonne quia Angelicum dereliquerunt? Quae cum ita sint, impossibile est eis divum Thomam sequi. ~~Et~~ Et si his non obstantibus sese Angelici sequaces dicunt, ipsi sunt "tanquam bruta animalia blasphemantes in ~~illis~~ iis quae ignorant," ut dixit ~~Albertus~~ Sanctus Albertus Magnus de iis qui contra suum ipsius ~~discipuli~~ discipuli "novitates" auctoritatem Patrum et Sanctorum ~~adferunt~~ attulerunt.

que

oppositionem

9. Abhorrendi sunt qui inter thomismum et alias theologiae scholas profundissimam ~~discrepantiam~~ agnoscere nolunt, qui omnium theologorum modo probativo procedentium conclusiones in idem referri posse contendunt, qui pestiferi docent optimos divi Thomae interpretes esse Suarezium et Molinam; qui tam leviter gloriosam Divi Thomae praemotionalis physicae doctrinam ~~transgrediuntur~~ ~~transgrediuntur~~ maxime scientificam transgrediuntur. Si de istis in Theologia maximis et certissimis tam leviter ~~loquuntur~~ loquuntur, quomodo interpretanda est ~~superbia~~ ~~eorum~~ ~~arrogantia~~ ~~circa~~ ~~profundas~~ ~~obscuritates~~ ~~Genesis~~, de quibus etiam tentativam quamcunque cogitationem ~~vel~~ vel prohibent vel imprudentem asserunt. Si saltem quae de his apud Patres ~~habentur~~ habentur docuissent, si saltem minus leviter ~~de~~ mirabili Sancti Augustini doctrina de opere sex dierum usi essent. Si saltem quaerentibus propriam ~~mentis~~ ~~mentis~~ ~~mentis~~ imponere noluissent.

ingenii tarditatem

1. Quaestio haec difficillima est propter multas distinctiones faciendas, praesertim inter ea quae de ~~hac~~ hac re in fide nobis revelantur et ipsum ~~problema in quantum alio et alio modo pertinet ad diversas disciplinas, ad sacram doctrinam scilicet (quam ut in cursu methodologiae vidimus a fide distinguendam), ad philosophiam, et ad scientias experimentales.~~

2. Hodie consuetum est contendere Ecclesiae Patres unanimiter contra nostram sententiam locutos esse. Ut postea ostendetur, omnino distinguendum est inter hanc de Patribus loquendi recentem consuetudinem quae in hoc fundatur quod unus auctor alterum ~~alium~~ transcribit et omnes in theologia loquentes abusive theologi dicuntur, et ipsum Patrum consensum qui totus contra verbum Dei ~~aligantibus~~ propriae mentis pigritiae alligantibus ~~revertendus~~ est.

3. Multi ~~in~~ in theologia loquentes, sub specie zelus domus Domini sed revera occulte protestantismo laborantes, et Sacrae Scripturae, et Traditioni, et Patribus, et Ecclesiae doctoribus, et Ecclesiae declarationibus sive doctrinalibus sive prudentialibus, propriam opinionem et praesertim propriam intellectus imbecillitatem imponunt.

*causa la
mundi in hunc*
4. Item, in praxi, multi in theologia loquentes, ~~various~~ varios theologiae locos rejiciunt, ut philosophia et scientiae experimentales, eo magis quo ~~sapientia~~ isti sapientiae nomen sibi vindicant. Revera, de sapientiae munere nihil intelligunt. Quomodo sapiens appellari potest ille in theologia loquens qui non solum ignorat quid sit philosophia et qualia sint philosophica, quid sit scientia experimentalis, et qualia et quibus rationibus adferuntur. Quod si talis esset sapientia, nihil facilius: quaedam enim qualitas esset virtute qua quilibet de quocunque praesertim ignorato solemniter judicare posset. Verum est quod ~~sapientia~~ sapiens non debet scire omnia, sed scire omnino ea de quibus et in quantum judicat.

5. Problema hoc tam arduum est et ~~rationes~~ tam subtiles rationes solventes ut ridiculum ~~esset~~ esset, etiam in theologia loquentes, pondere argumentorum convincere velle. Et nota hoc novitiae, quia multi sunt cartesianismo affecti, ac si proprietas solidi argumenti esset cujuscumque intellectum cogere posse. Timete in angulis ~~loquentes~~ loquentes coram pueris qui ~~nesciunt~~ nesciunt de causis arduis judicare, falsi nominis scientia gloriabundos. Et scite quod ipse divus Thomas aliquando periculum Ecclesiae appellatus est et averroismo accusatus. Haec scripsit Joannes Peckham (1240-1292) qui ~~aliquando~~ Parisiis docuit et Oxonii et postea archiepiscopus cantuariensis creatus est, de thomistis ~~in litteris ad curiam romanam,~~ in litteris ad curiam romanam, 1 Jan. 1285: "Haec idcirco vobis scripsimus, sancte pater, ut... sacrosancta Romana ecclesia attendere dignetur, quod cum doctrina duorum ordinum (O.P. et O.F.M.) in omnibus dubitabilibus sibi pene penitus hodie adversetur, cunque doctrina alterius eorundem, abjectis et ex parte vilipensis sanctorum sententiis, philosophicis dogmatibus quasi totaliter innitatur, ut plena sit idolis domus

...quantum inde futuris temporibus poterit ecclesiae periculum imminere." (Cf. Fr. Ehrle, John Peckham uber den Kampf des Augustinismus und Aristotelismus in der zweiten Hälfte des 13n Jahrhunderts, dans Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie, XIIIr Bd. (1889), S. 172 ff.) Et eodem anno, ad episcopum ~~quendam~~ anglicum: "Philosophorum studia minime reprobamus, quatenus mysteriis theologicis famulantur, sed prophanas vocum novitates, quae contra philosophicam veritatem sunt in sanctorum injuriam citra viginti annos in altitudines theologicas introductae, abjectis et vilipensis sanctorum essertionibus evidenter. Quae sit ergo solidior et sanior doctrina, vel filiorum S. Francisci, sanctae scilicet memoriae fratris Alexandri et Bonaventurae et consimilium, qui in suis tractatibus ab omni calumnia alienis sanctis et philosophis innituntur; vel illa novella quasi tota contraria, quae quidquid docet Augustinus de regulis aeternis et de luce incommutabili, de potentiis animae, de rationibus seminalibus inditis materiae et consimilibus innumeris, destruat pro viribus et enervat, pugnas verborum inferens toti mundo, videant antiqui in quibus est sapientia, videat et corrigat Deus coeli." (1 Julii, 1285. - Op. cit., p. 182 et sq.) Haec et multa alia zelatores contra principia omnino fundamentalia thomismi.

6. Abhorrendi sunt etiam ii qui inter thomismum et alias scholas profundissimam distinctionem in theologia agnoscere nolunt, et ~~maximè~~ ~~omnium~~ ~~theologorum~~ ~~modo~~ ~~probativo~~ ~~procedentium~~ ~~conclusiones~~ ~~ad~~ ~~idem~~ ~~referri~~ ~~posse~~ ~~contendunt~~, qui ~~divi~~ ~~Thomae~~ ~~Suarezium~~ ~~et~~ ~~Molinam~~ ~~optimos~~ ~~interpretes~~ ~~dicunt~~.

7. Omnino vitanda est derisio infidelium, ut de hac ipsa materia divus Thomas semper ~~dixit~~ dixit. Maxime imprudentes illi in theologia loquentes qui aperte, absque ulla ratione, nec ex fide, nec ex theologia, nec ex philosophia, scientiae experimentalis dicta spernunt, eo magis quo in ~~h~~ iis ignorantes sunt; ut dicit sanctus Albertus Magnus ~~Ariskoketamzdefendex~~ "tanquam bruta animalia blasphemantes in ~~h~~ iis quae ignorant." Non capiunt quod falsi nominis fide ipsam fidem in derisionem vocant. Hoc autem certum est quod biologia experimentalis ut nunc extant, et quae gloriose ab intellectus imbecillitate laborantes vel oleosa pigritia vel velata superbia, sine generali evolutionis hypothesi omnino inintelligibilis est, ut adhuc recenter a maxime in his peritis dictum est. Sed quomodo rationibus scientiae cogi possent? Nec de hoc curandum esset si ~~maximè~~ ~~fidei~~ ~~z~~ ~~maximè~~ ~~derogaretur~~ ~~ipsis~~ ~~salivantibus~~ ~~nostrae~~ ~~fidei~~ ~~non~~ ~~derogaretur~~.

8. ~~Quod~~ ~~vero~~ ~~ad~~ ~~infideles~~ ~~attinet~~, omnino imprudens esset ~~maximè~~ ~~evolutionem~~ ~~contra~~ ~~fidem~~ ~~esse~~ ~~dicere~~.

9. Quand ad istos in theologia loquentes attinet, omnino inutile est cum eis disputationem agere, cum eorum proprio iudicio jam pleni sunt vel scientia vel sufficientia. Sciens autem non interrogat, ut dicit Aristoteles, ~~non~~ nec sibi metipsi sufficiens, et in stultitia beatus. Hoc pro certo ~~tenendum~~ tenendum est: argumentis convinci ~~non~~ ~~possunt~~, de quo tamen curandum non est. ~~Scientia~~ ~~enim~~ ~~procedit~~ ~~ex~~ ~~principiis~~, quibus ignoratis, conclusio vana est.

De l'appétit de la matière.

I. Quid sit: I. Physic., lect. 15, nn. 9 & 10. - Non est aliqua actio materiae: De Pot., q. 4, a. 1, ad 2. - Jean de s. Thomas, Curs. Phil., T. II, pp. 78-80.

II. Utrum oporteat "quod in ulteriorem et perfectissimum actum quem materia consequi potest tendat appetitus materiae quo appetit formam, sicut in ultimum finem generationis". C. Gentes, III, 22.

Or, JSTH. semble dire nettement le contraire, p. 79b. En outre, s. Thomas lui-même s'exprime dans les mêmes termes en l'endroit auquel renvoie JSTH: Ia, q. 66, a. 2, c. - On le voit, l'argument est appuyé sur le principe: "potentia, quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum".

Cependant, l'argument C. G. III, 22: "Quum vero, ut dictum est, quaelibet res mota..." est démonstratif. Comment concilier cette apparente contradiction?

III. Avant de passer à une solution tentative, considérons les points suivants:

1. La fin ultime à laquelle est ordonnée la matière, c'est la forme en tant qu'elle est quelque chose de divin, i.e. une participation de l'acte pur: I Physic., c. 9, lect. 15, n. 7. Ajoutez à cette idée l'argument de C. G. III, c. 22.

~~2. Si la matière était indifférente au degré de perfection~~

2. Si la matière était indifférente au degré de perfection de la forme, le degré de perfection de la forme serait accidentel. ~~Il en suivrait que la matière tendrait "per se" vers la forme de corporéité, "per accidens" vers des formes plus parfaites.~~ Il en suivrait que la matière tendrait "per se" vers la forme de corporéité, "per accidens" vers des formes plus parfaites. On tomberait ainsi dans l'erreur que JST veut éviter, p. 79b9-17. Du reste, on ne voit pas comment la matière et la forme pourraient constituer un "unum per se". Cette position met en question l'unité de la forme substantielle.

3. La perfection de la matière ne consiste pas dans l'actuation successive en tant que successive. La succession des formes devrait être indéfiniment continuée. La matière ne peut pas avoir la succession en acte: celle-ci comporte un constant au-delà. Le terme d'une semblable succession est irréalisable. (de Pot., q. 5, a. 5, c.)

4. Si la matière est indifférente au degré de perfection de la forme, les formes seront homogènes par rapport à l'appétit de la matière. D'où les deux conséquences: (a) elle poursuit le multiple purement numérique, ce qui est impossible, car "nullum agens intendit pluralitatem materialem ut finem; quia materialis multitudo non habet certum terminum, sed de se tendit in infinitum. Infinitum autem repugnat rationi finis." Ia, q. 47, a. 3, ad 2; (b) cette poursuite serait futile pour une autre raison: les nouvelles formes ne lui donneraient aucun acte nouveau comme forme. En d'autres termes: la matière tendrait vers l'acte en faisant un retour sur elle-même dans l'indéfinie diffusion de la multiplicité matérielle dont la matière est elle-même le fait le plus accompli.

2

5. Si la matière était indifférente ~~à la perfection~~ au degré de perfection de la forme, et notez bien que la forme est essentiellement "species", il faudrait en conclure que ~~la~~ "forma est propter materiam", que les formes ne sont désirées que comme termes provisoires d'un ~~un~~ irréalisable multiple indéfini: toute forme, quelle qu'elle soit, présente ou future, serait victime de l'appétit de la matière: la forme n'existerait que pour assouvir un appétit inassouvissable. Par conséquent la forme naturelle serait par sa nature même inadéquate. Et si l'on disait que l'appétit de la matière atteint son objet dans la succession des formes, il s'ensuivrait, il me semble, ~~qu'il s'ensuivrait~~ que la succession serait la forme désirée. (Ia, q. 47, a. 2, c.)

6. On pourrait objecter que la matière n'est pas ordonnée principalement aux formes individuelles, mais à la perfection de l'univers tout entier. Or, le principe sur lequel est appuyée cette objection confirme notre position. La perfection de l'univers est en effet nécessairement la fin de la matière. Rien n'est ordonné à la matière, et celle-ci est une relation transcendente. // Or, la perfection de ~~la~~ l'univers consiste dans son unité d'ordre essentielle. Or, l'unité d'ordre essentielle est constituée par les formes en tant que "species", en tant qu'hétérogènes. (Pour la différence entre le tout homogène et le tout hétérogène, cf. Ia, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2.) Plus les formes sont parfaites, plus elles diffèrent les unes des autres. (de Spir. Creat., a. 8, c.)

perfection de l'univers consiste dans son unité d'ordre: "Nam id quod est optimum, maxime habet rationem finis intenti. Optimum autem in rerum universitate est bonum ordinis: hoc enim est bonum commune, caetera vero sunt singularia bona." (De subst. Separatis, c. 10) Or cette unité d'ordre n'est pas constituée de parties homogènes, par la distinction matérielle. (Sur la différence entre "tout homogène" et "tout hétérogène" cf. Ia, q. 11, a. 2, ad 2; pour "distinctio materialis" et "distinctio formalis", Ia, q. 47, a. 2, c.) "Quia enim aliquod totum perfectum fit, secundum hoc diversas partes et inequales ad ejus compositionem conducit. Si enim omnes essent aequales, jam non esset totum perfectum: quod patet tam in toto naturali quam in toto civili. Non enim esset corpus hominis perfectum, nisi membra diversa et inaequalis dignitatis haberet; neque esset civitas perfecta, nisi inaequales condiciones et officia diversa in civitate existerent." (de subst. separ., c. 10)

Plus les formes sont parfaites, plus elles sont essentielles à la perfection de l'univers. (Cf. de Spir. Creat., a. 8, c.) Bien que l'homme soit venu le dernier, il est essentiel à la perfection du monde, et avec les anges il est essentiel à la perfection de l'univers tout entier. "...nam homo ordinatur ad perfectionem universi ut essentialis pars ipsius". (de Pot., q. 5, a. 10, c.)

Cf. surtout, de Pot., q. 5, a. 9, o; CG. IV, c. 97.

Donc, si la matière tend vers la perfection de l'univers, et si cette perfection ~~consiste exclusivement~~ n'est réalisée que par les formes plus parfaites, elle tend davantage vers ces formes. Si elle était indifférente au degré de perfection de ces formes, elle serait indifférente à sa raison d'être.

IV. Solution de la difficulté. Il est très certain que la contradiction que nous tentons de dissoudre n'est qu'apparente.

1. Notez bien la précision des termes employés par s. Thomas: "potentia quantum est de se, indifferenter se habet ad perfectum et imperfectum". Il ne considère pas la ~~matière~~ matière dans la perspective de toutes les causes, il considère la matière simplement comme

3
capacité. Or si nous considérons l'appétit de la matière comme l'appétit de tout ce dont elle est capable, il est entendu ~~qu'elle~~ qu'il s'étend également à toutes les formes. Il en est de même dans le cas de la connaissance: notre intelligence s'étend à toute chose "sub ratione entis", tant à l'imparfait qu'au parfait. Il s'agit donc simplement de la capacité de la matière. En effet, si la matière était plus apte à avoir les formes plus parfaites, les formes inférieures n'auraient aucune raison d'être: elles seraient ^(m) contraires à l'appétit de la matière. Pour comprendre cette manière de parler il faut résolument faire abstraction de la causalité finale. Bien que JST ~~dit~~ parle de "finis et perfectio materiae" (p. 79b43), il s'agit toujours de la fin et de la perfection de la matière considérée en elle-même, i.e. comme pure capacité dont reste à déterminer la fin principale et dernière. Cette considération séparée de la matière première n'est pas sans difficulté.

2. Mais il est très important de marquer qu'on ne peut pas isoler les textes de s. Thomas de leur contexte. Il faut toujours tenir compte de l'endroit où ils se trouvent. Or, le texte en question ~~est~~ se trouve dans la deuxième partie de la Ia Pars où il s'agit de Dieu cause efficiente. Plus spécialement la q. 66 se trouve dans la section où s. Thomas traite des creatures "tam quoad naturam eorum et essentiam, quam quoad proprietates et operationes, et productionem in esse." (JST, Curs. Theol., I, p. 147). L'étude de Dieu comme cause finale est réservée à la IIa Pars. Il n'était donc pas nécessaire de parler de finalité absolue de la matière première.

D'autre part, le texte de la CG qui semble contredire celui de la Ia Pars, est tiré du livre III, lequel ~~est consacré~~ traite "de ordine creaturarum in Deum sicut in finem." (Sylvester Ferrariensis, Comment. in III C.G., c. 1) Et de même que la matière est présentée ici comme tendant principalement vers la forme humaine, ~~la connaissance de Dieu est~~ de même la connaissance de Dieu est la fin de toute substance intellectuelle, et l'argument dont se sert s. Thomas ~~est~~ (c. 25, "Adhuc, Unumquodque tendit in divinam similitudinem sicut in proprium finem....") est fondé sur les mêmes principes employés au ~~22~~ c. 22.

145
3. Pourquoi ces différentes perspectives entraînent-elles des conséquences aussi importantes? La réponse gît dans le principe: "bonum est diffusivum sui". Mais il ~~le faut~~ l'entendre au sens que lui accorde s. Thomas: "Cum autem dicitur quod bonum est diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda effusio secundum quod importat ~~operationem~~ operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita. Dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis, et non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, in quantum huiusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis initium; tum quia effectus participat causam efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum; sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni." (De Ver., q. 21, a. 1, ad 4) Donc, si nous faisons abstraction ~~de la finalité~~ de la finalité, nous ne pouvons pas connaître la véritable "mensura et perfectio" de la matière.

Ce n'est donc que dans la perspective de la fin absolument dernière que la matière tend vers l'âme humaine "sicut in ultimam formam", et que cette âme "est finis omnium formarum naturalium". (De Spir. creat., a. 2, c.)

Un catholique peut-il admettre l'évolution? L'évolution ne contredit-elle pas l'enseignement de la Bible? Peut-elle se concilier avec la théorie chrétienne de la vie? N'a-t-elle pas démontré la descendance animale de l'homme?

Comme l'Eglise n'a porté aucune décision contre l'évolution, un catholique peut librement l'admettre comme hypothèse scientifique ou comme spéculation philosophique. Qu'est-ce que l'évolution? ((Comme hypothèse scientifique, écrit Wasmann, l'évolution affirme que les espèces actuelles de plantes et d'animaux viennent non pas directement de Dieu, mais par évolution des autres espèces qui existaient dans les périodes géologiques précédentes... Elle ne s'occupe pas de l'origine de la vie, mais recherche simplement les relations génétiques des espèces, des genres et des familles qu'elle essaie de coordonner selon l'ordre de descendance naturelle."2

L'évolution n'est pas un fait prouvé, malgré les affirmations de plusieurs savants. Elle n'est pas davantage une science [Page 193 et suivantes. - 2 Ce. vé5, p. 654)

expérimentale. Essentiellement elle est une théorie. basée sur un ensemble d'hypothèses qui offrent l'explication la plus probable de l'origine des espèces organiques. Comme hypothèse elle a stimulé la recherche scientifique et apporté plusieurs contributions nouvelles; mais elle pose plus de problèmes qu'elle n'en résout.

La Bible n'est pas un manuel de sciences; elle ne peut-être citée pour ou contre l'évolution. " Les écrivains sacrés, dit Léon XII dans Providentissimus, n'ont pas voulu enseigner aux hommes ces vérités concernant la constitution intime des objets visibles, parce qu'elles ne devaient leur servir de rien pour leur salut. Aussi ces auteurs, sans s'attacher à bien observer la nature, décrivent quelquefois les objets et en parlent, ou par une sorte de métaphore, ou comme le comportait le langage usité à cette époque. Il en est encore ainsi aujourd'hui beaucoup de points, dans la vie quotidienne, même parmi les hommes les plus savants. Dans le langage vulgaire on désigne d'abord et par le mot propre les objets qui tombent sous les sens."

L'évolution ne contredit pas la théorie chrétienne de la vie. " Si le Créateur, écrit Hammerstein, n'a pas créé dans sa forme actuelle chaque espèce d'animal, mais la lui a fait acquérir par l'évolution, il manifeste sa sagesse et sa puissance avec plus d'éclat... En effet, supposez qu'un joueur de Billard veuille frapper cent billes dans des directions différentes. Paraîtra-t-il plus habile en frappant séparément chacune des cent billes vers son but ou en frappant une seule bille qui poussera les quatre-vingt-dix-neuf autres dans les directions visées? "2 L'âme humaine essentiellement différente de l'âme animale ne peut venir de l'évolution elle ne peut commencer d'exister que par création. Mais le corps humain a pu se former par évolution; cependant les preuves qu'on en a présentées ne l'ont pas encore démontré. Au congrès international de zoologie tenu à Cambridge en 1888 Haeckel osa affirmer que la descendance animale de l'homme était un fait prouvé d'éminents savants ont protesté contre cette fausseté. 3. Cette théorie qui n'est pas intrinsèquement impossible ne fut jamais condamnée par les congrégations romaines; elle semble cependant contraire à l'esprit général de l'Eglise.

1. Actes de Léon XIII, éd. BZP// BP., t. 4, p. 35. - Gottesbeweise 150-

3 Déjà en 1868 Darwin lui écrivait: " Votre audace me fait quelquefois trembler."

Bibliographie: De Nadaillac, L'homme et la singe. SR. 46-47;

De Sinety, Transformisme, DA, t. 4, c. 1793-1848; I. Lerot, Pour et contre l'évolution SR. 140-141; H. Muckermann, Evolution, CE, c.5, pp. 654-679

"La Boite aux questions" B. L. Conway - Pauliste
Traduction: Adrien Malo

de Kainick -
January 1961
Note Dene -

Evolutions St. Marys College
XIX. Excursus: A New meaning of 'Science and the Possible'

1960-6

We must be made aware that the type-writing-monkeys hypothesis² has given new meaning to 'science and the possible.' For we are told that random groupings of the letters of the alphabet could produce all the works in the Library of Congress. There is of course no doubt that all extant writings are in fact one set of possible arrangements of the elements of speech. But the hypothesis in question is not content merely to observe this possibility, it is determined to make of it an explanation of the actuality: it appears that random permutations of these elements could produce a set of groupings entirely similar to the one at hand, and therefore equally meaningful. Those who take the possibility of such an event in earnest³ must of course maintain that anything produced by intellect or reason can be perfectly matched by blind, purposeless agency in the way Socrates can meet his debtor not only by design but also by chance. Thus a man, as no more than one possible arrangement of electrical charges, could be the product of chance. Such reasoning seems to underlie at least one interpretation of evolution, namely, that new species are sufficiently accounted for by random mutations, 'selected' by irrational forces. Now, does this mean anything more than that new species arise because they are possible? On this basis the whole universe would be explained by stating that it is a possible one - as anyone can see from the fact that it exists.

1. This digression may help to show what Aristotle and Aquinas meant by the term 'possible' as related to science.

2. "Concevons qu'on ait dressé un million de singes à frapper au hasard sur les touches d'une machine à écrire et que, sous la surveillance de contremaitres illettrés, ces singes dactylographes travaillent avec ardeur dix heures par jour avec un million de machines à écrire de types variés. Les contremaitres illettrés rassembleraient les feuilles noircies et les relieraient en volumes. Et au bout d'un an, ces volumes se trouveraient renfermer la copie exacte des livres de toute nature et de toutes langues conservés dans les plus riches bibliothèques du monde. Telle est la probabilité pour qu'il se produise pendant un instant très court, dans le récipient A, un écart de l'ordre du cent-millième dans la composition du mélange gazeux. Supposer que cet écart ainsi produit subsistera pendant quelques secondes revient à admettre que, pendant plusieurs années, notre armée de singes dactylographes, travaillant toujours dans les mêmes conditions, fournira chaque jour la copie exacte de tous les imprimés livres et journaux qui paraîtront le jour correspondant de la semaine suivante sur toute la surface du globe et de toutes les paroles qui seront prononcées par tous les hommes en ce même jour. Il est plus simple de dire que ces écarts improbables sont purement impossibles." Emile Borel, Le hasard, Paris, Alcan, 1938, pp. 164-165.

This is simply A R I O T

3. Emile Borel was not one of them. The hypothesis is usually held by non-mathematicians who are unaware that within the limits of calculus itself there is nothing probable. They are like biologists who believe that in physics and chemistry all is entirely accessible to the human mind.

1. Possibility and existence

This view is an ancient one. It can be traced back to Democritus and Empedocles, and was given new form by Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Perhaps the latter states it most clearly, in his doctrine that all possible predicates are virtually contained in their subjects: "The notion of an individual substance contains once and for all everything that may ever happen to it (enferme une fois pour toutes tout ce qui lui peut jamais arriver) and, the contemplation of this notion can reveal all that may ever truly be asserted of it (tout ce qui se pourra véritablement énoncer d'elle); even as there may be seen in the

nature of circle all the properties that can be inferred from it." In other words, contingency is only necessity in disguise. For, "God, seeing the individual notion or thisness (*hecceite*) of Alexander, sees in it at the same time the foundation and reason of all the predicates which can be truly said of him, as, for instance, whether he would conquer Darius and Porus, even to knowing a priori (and not by experience) whether he died a natural death or by poison, which we can know only by history."

Notice that it is not the mere possible substance and predicates that are the issue, but real substance and its actual history. The point Leibniz is trying to make is that adequate knowledge of the possible has got to mean knowledge of what has been, is, and shall be. Of course we agree that if Caesar crossed the Rubicon it must no doubt have been possible - in both senses of 'possible.' But he did not by necessity cross the Rubicon, and might have taken many other courses which in fact he did not take. Why, then, should contemplation of his other possible predicates enable one to behold him actually crossing the Rubicon? How dare we assert that knowledge of all that is possible is vision of all that in fact exists? What happens to that which might have been, but in fact did not occur? Where are these 'all possible predicates' going to end?

Spinoza held that whatever is possible comes to be, whereas Leibniz confined the realm of real possibility to the compossible, in such a way that existence follows analytically, so to speak, from whatever is compossible. (1)

1. Our example of impossibility would be "to stand and be seated at the same time," whereas to be standing in fact and to be able to sit down are compossible; able to stand, and able to sit down are simultaneously compossible with lying down. No amount of intuiting this compossibility will make us see that the one who is capable of these diverse positions shall have them in fact. Nothing actually follows from this kind of compossibility: the fact that I can stand does not entail that I shall (although the fact that I am destructible entails that I shall be destroyed, which is necessary as opposed to possible). Leibniz's compossibility is of another kind, for he seems to mean that things which are not impossible must come to be. Bertrand Russell's account of why, according to Leibniz, some things exist and others, equally possible, do not, is substantially correct, though not compatible, nor does it aim to be, with all that Leibniz wrote. "According to this view (Lord Russell says), everything that does not exist struggles to exist, but not all possibles can exist, because they are not all 'compossible.' It may be possible that A should exist, and also possible that B should exist, but not possible that both A and B should exist; in that case, A and B are not 'compossible.' Two or more things are only 'compossible' when it is possible for all of them to exist. Leibniz seems to have imagined a sort of war in the Limbo inhabited by essences all trying to exist; in this war, groups of compossibles combine, and the largest group of compossibles wins, like the largest pressure group in a political contest. Leibniz even uses this conception as a way of defining existence. He says: 'The existent may be defined as that which is compatible with more things than is anything incompatible with itself.' That is to say, if A is incompatible with B, while A is compatible with C and D and E, but B is only compatible with F and G, then A, but not B, exists by definition. 'The existent,' he says, 'is the being which is compatible with the most things.' - In this account, there is no mention of God, and apparently no act of creation. Nor is there need of anything but pure logic for determining what exists. The question whether A and B are compossible is, for Leibniz, a logical question, namely: Does the existence of both A and B involve a contradiction? It follows that, in theory, logic can decide the question what group of compossibles is the largest, and this group consequently will exist." A History of Western Philosophy, Simon and Schuster, New York 1945, p. 694. 'Struggle to exist' is of course a metaphor, since compossibility is the *raison suffisante* of what actually comes to be.

Source: quint abstract from Milton in ref to it implies possibility or a potential s. must be contradictory 3
Source: Knowledge of what is necessary ^{Substance of his theory in early thinking being}

This qualification might lead one to believe, erroneously, that Leibniz's qualification is reducible to Aristotle's conditions of real possibility - as distinguished from what is possible in logic or in mathematics, where 'possible' and 'potency' are metaphors. Real possibility, such as that of walking, contains many things. These are in fact innumerable, and any account of such possibility must be largely incomplete. An adequate account would have to draw upon the whole unwieldy universe. However complete our knowledge of the conditions of any man's walking, it could not make us see him striding along. "...Anything which is possible is something possible at some time and in some way, with all the other qualifications which must be present in the notion." (1) Aristotle then goes on to show how natural possibilities differ from the rational. In nature, provided the required conditions are satisfied, the really possible, the physical potency, becomes actual - at least for the most part. "For the non-rational potencies are all productive of one part. For the non-rational potencies are all productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects, so that if they produced their effects necessarily they would produce contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible. There must then be something else that decides; I mean by this, desire or will." (1) In other words, rational powers are of contradiction, and determined to one of the opposites by will, for the doctor can use his skill or refuse to do so; or he can use it to heal but also to kill. Yet there is likewise a potentia simul contradictionis in nature, inasmuch as the powers of action or passion may be present or absent, as when an animal may lose its sight (2) But this is precisely the kind of potency or possibility which Leibniz must deny.

Leibniz did not of course believe that we humans can achieve the adequate knowledge which he so confidently described. He thought nonetheless that we can approach it. Only the possible that is compossible with other things does in fact come to exist. (We would say 'can come to exist'.) Adequate knowledge is approached as one discerns which possibilities are more favoured; and this is to be achieved by a "logique des probabilités" along with infinitesimal analysis. (Again, we would say that the application of this logic and analysis must presuppose a given existential situation.) All the same, Leibniz was aware that sheer compossibility can hardly account for what actually comes to be; he felt the need to posit some kind of finality. But this finality has nothing to do with action for the sake of something; 'that for the sake of which' is not conceived as a cause,

1. Ibid. - Nature and reason are distinguished by the difference between contraries as in our knowing, and contraries as in fact. In fact a man cannot at the same time see and be blind; but in knowing blindness, he must simultaneously grasp what sight is. For sight is implicit in the very notion of blindness, just as any positive term is essential to its negation, and the perception of one term as contrary is dependent upon the representation of its opposite. This supposes a radical difference between the corresponding subjects of any contrariety. So, if the differences between contraries are held to be finally one and the same, the real, as distinguished from the rational, will involve contradiction (which is the way some people want it): just as one cannot conceive blindness without simultaneously conceiving sight, nor think death without thinking life, so one could not actually see without being actually blind, or be alive without being also dead. This impossibility cannot be escaped by anyone who refuses to allow a significant distinction between mind and nature. All the same, there are instances of simultaneous contrariety outside the mind - providing ample room for confusion. A plant, for instance, grows in contrary directions; and a thing becoming white is neither determinately white nor not-white. But these cases differ widely from that of the mind; the first involves parts that are quantitatively external to one another, while becoming remains this side of full actuality. - Cf. Q.D. de Veritate, q.23.a.1.

- In. IX Metaph., l. 19.

- position, simul contradictionis in nature is always a defect or something like that.

But as an end-result that follows from compossibility - the true cause of coming to be.

Such a position is easily reached by means of a threefold confusion: by identifying (a) the possible opposed to the necessary, with the possible opposed to the impossible; (b) and simultaneously the possible opposed to the impossible with the necessary, on the grounds that whatever is possible is necessarily possible; (c) the true and the possible, ignoring that something may be false, yet possible; or possible though not true - e.g., to say that Socrates is standing when he is in fact sitting down, is false, yet, though sitting down, it is possible that he stand. Thus, by a fallacy of equivocation, making univocal use of the term 'possible' we have ruled out all potentia simul contradictionis. (1) Now we understand the basic principle: "Principium meum est, quicquid existere potest, et aliis compatibile est, id existere." This plainly means that whatever is compatible, was, is, or shall come to be. Elephants came to be because they are compossible permutations of the stuff they are made of, and compossible with the rest of the world. We might have known as much, of course, but how does this explain the kind of beasts they are or why they should be at all? It is difficult to see how Leibniz's theory - namely, that to be actual the possible must be of the compossible kind - could be anything more than mere tautology in disguise. The aim of his *Characteristica Universalis* was to replace thinking by calculation, i.e. by a mechanical concatenation of tautologies. (2)

The hypothesis referred to at the beginning of this section contains still another fallacy of equivocation, based upon univocal use of the term 'chance', as if whatever happens at random happened by chance understood as an accidental cause. There was a further fallacy - one of *latius hoc* - in concluding that a certain event may always be the products of chance because it may at one time be the effect of a *per se* cause and at another of an accidental one. Let us first face the ambiguity of 'What happens at random happens by chance.' I throw a pair of dice at random. Now, they are not thrown by chance, for it was by deliberate purpose that I threw them at random. Hence, if the expression 'good luck,' or 'good fortune,' is used when desirable numbers turn up, it is not being used in the sense that the accidental discovery of treasure by a man digging a well is called good fortune. I mean that we have changed the imposition of the term on the basis of a certain similarity, in respect to uncertainty, between the result of a random cast and the casual or fortuitous event. But in obtaining a desirable pair of numbers on the dice no chance is involved in the true sense of this term - unless someone accidentally nudged me and thus favoured the shot. Because, as I throw the dice at random I am quite aware of the alternatives, so that no matter which sides turn up, I cannot normally ascribe the result to chance, unless the meaning of this term be extended - as in 'the laws of chance.' And it may be worth remarking that chance in this extended sense, becomes a very equivocal term indeed, since it now means 'degrees of probability,' whereas true chance is always highly improbable. Similarly, if I bring down a duck with shot, this event may not be attributed to chance because of the random distribution of the pellets. There may perhaps have been a good reason why this particular pellet struck the game, but my intention will not explain it, because my intention was not set upon this pellet. Many pellets were stuffed into my cartridge (at random) so that the 'chance' (probability) of striking the goal might be enhanced. Nature is doing much the same in producing huge amounts of spores or of sperm most of which will fortunately never reach fruition. Yet without such enormous calculated waste, all living species would soon be extinct. So that, though it be by chance that this spore germinates, there is a very little 'chance' that germination will not take place somewhere.

2. Science and accidental cause

To show, in turn, how easily the term 'accidental cause' lends itself to fallacies of equivocation, we have only to examine several of its meanings. (1)

1. The identification of 'possible' with the opposite of necessary would mean that this potentia holds sway over all; which leads in turn to the paradox that 'everything is contingent' except that everything is contingent; in other words, 'the necessary is impossible' - except that it is necessarily impossible.

2. Hobbes held a somewhat similar view of reasoning. "Per ratiocinationem... intelligi compu-
tationem. Computationem autem plurimum rerum simul additionem subtrahendumque dicitur." (4.)

(2) *Cont. alia detracta, cognoscere residuum. Ratiocinari igitur idem est quod addere et subtrahere.*"
Opera Philosophica, Wolessworth, 1839-1845, vol. I, p. 3.

(1). In V *Metaph*, lect. 3

(2) Science and accidental cause (Cont.)

(a) 'The doctor builds' is an instance of accidental cause by reason of something accidentally connected with the *per se* cause (the builder as such) considered on the part of the cause itself. To be a doctor, red-headed, a husband, tall, walking, and so on, is incidental to the builder; it is nonetheless true to say that this doctor builds, if he does, or this red-headed fellow builds, etc. There is in fact no end to such possible incidentals, some of which arise unceasingly, such as the advancing age of the builder, or his growing baldness; that he be fifty years old today may be false tomorrow, for instance, or if false today, it may be true tomorrow or at some later time. However, not all accidental causes, so-called by reason of something connected with the *per se* cause, are accidental in quite the same sense. It is *per accidens* that a man builds a house, else he could not be a man unless a builder. But it is not *per accidens* that the builder is a man (unless building comprise nests, ant-hills, hives, beaver-dams, and so on), even though he is not a builder simply *qua* man. Similarly, any given builder must of necessity have some age, one that advances necessarily as he builds, for he and his building are measured by time. In the latter cases, accidental is not opposed to necessary. Notice how inescapable is this infinity of accidental causes related to any builder. In a sense, they comprise the whole universe, inasmuch as the builder is in fact at such a place and such a time, as well as constantly elsewhere and later; and he will be one of so many people unceasingly varying in number, or one of so many kinds of animals, of living beings, of beings, and so on. But if the range of this kind of accidental causality is infinite, not every instance of it is equally close to the *per se* cause. That the builder, for example, be a man is more immediate and necessary than that he must of necessity be an animal, or a mammal. To live at this address rather than at that one is more accidental to the builder than to have been trained by a man in his fifties rather than by one in his sixties; that he be a husband is less incidental than that he should be bald. This sort of accidental causality reveals a new infinity then, one of degrees of relationship to the *per se*. Now, because all incidentals, however near to or remote from the *per se* cause, no matter how necessary or contingent they may be, are always a reason why the *per se* cause (the builder), is also an accidental cause (the builder *qua* man or *qua* bald), some are inclined to put all incidentals on the same level - now concluding that all incidentals are equally necessary, now that all are equally contingent. In either case utter confusion and unintelligibility must result: something the Anaxagorean *Nous* might be called upon to unscramble. It is the old story. The incidentals are there, hence they have got to be there; or, the incidentals are plainly incidental, therefore they are all equally incidental. Aristotle never falls into such over-simplifications.

(b) From a quite different point of view a cause may be called accidental by reason of that which may occur to its effect, i.e. when something happens to the *per se* effect of an agent. There are three different types of such accidental causality.

(1) When the additional effect is related to the *per se* effect by necessity. For example, if to reach a certain place I must walk a muddy path, the walking through mud is incidental though necessary; or, if I pull down a column and the stone on top of it falls to the ground, I will be called the moving, though incidental, cause of this inevitable fall. Another instance of *removens prohibens* would be the opening in a cloud which accounts for a shaft of sunlight reaching the earth at such or such a spot. Taken in this sense, the accidental cause is not, as such, opposed to a necessary one. My awareness or non-awareness that the stone must fall if I pull away the column will not make its fall less necessary; yet it remains accidental in this particular sense of accidental. Nowadays, 'cause' is mostly used in the sense of *removens prohibens*.

6

(II) The second type of accidental causality, is so called by reason of an effect which merely occurs to the effect intended per se, with no trace of necessary connection. This type is confined to causes acting for a purpose. It is essential to it that whatever happens to the effect should happen neither necessarily, so far as the agent is concerned, nor for the most part, but so seldom that there can be no reason to expect it. For example, a man digs a well for water and discovers a treasure. Digging at this spot he cannot fail to discover the treasure; the discovery is nonetheless purely contingent to what he intended as he dug. He is an accidental cause of this piece of good luck, no matter how predictable it was to his neighbor who knew all the time there was a treasure at that spot and in fact suggested digging for water precisely there. Strange to say, the neighbor could thus become the per se cause of a strictly contingent event. (1) Notice how 'that for the sake of which' - namely, a good to be achieved or a harm to be avoided - is essential to this type of accidental cause, meaning that the treasure is a thing the man would have dug for had he known it was or might be there. Similarly, had Socrates intended or expected to meet his debtor in the market today, or thought he might be there, the encounter would no longer be fortuitous. (2) In other words, whatever happens by chance in this sense of the word - the second meaning of accidental cause, taken from the effect - must be something which the agent would deliberately pursue or avoid; if what occurs accidentally to an effect intended by the agent were indifferent to him, one would not speak of fortune or chance in the sense here described. It follows that if there are to be chance events in nature, i.e. outside human agency, they will suppose that nature, too, in her own way, acts for the sake of something, namely, to achieve a good or to avoid harm. (1)

1. Contra Gentiles, III, c.92: "Patet etiam quod etiam homo qui sciret thesaurum esse ibi, posset alium ignorantem mittere ad fodendum sepulcrum in loco eodem, ut. praeter intentionem suam inveniret thesaurum."

2. In II Physicorum, Lect. 8:

1. In the Physics (II, cc.4-6) where Aristotle treats of chance in nature, he nonetheless first analyses fortune. The reason is that the latter, occurring as it does in rational agents, is more obvious as to us; whereas in nature, chance is more hidden, even as in final causality itself. Regarding this causality, though causa causarum, it comes last in the division of causes and required more proof than the other species of cause. St. Thomas explains why. "Et quia de fine vedebatur minus quod esset causa, propter hoc quod est ultimum in esse, unde etiam ab aliis prioribus philosophis haec causa est praetermissa, ut in primo libro praehabuitur est, ideo specialiter probat de fine quod sit causa." In V Metaph., lect. 2.

It is interesting that even accidental causes are not always opposed to necessity. The above divisions make this clear. The first case (a), for instance, may be one of absolute necessity, for the builder of houses is necessarily a man; or it may be one of hypothetical necessity, for this bald builder cannot now build without being bald - even though his baldness be purely incidental. Neither is the first instance (b, i) of a cause accidental by reason of the effect opposed to necessity, for if I pull away the column, the stone must fall, or, if the earth is exposed to the sun and there is a break in the clouds, more light will reach the surface of the earth. (However, we may not say that the clouds opened so that sunlight might reach the earth, though this may in fact be good or harmful for the crops. To make such a statement would be contrary to the rule that effects must be related to causes proportioned to these effects - *causae debent proportionaliter respondere effectus*.) (1) Only in the second case (b, ii) is accidental cause opposed to necessity. Yet, even this one must be qualified. For if a man digs a well deep enough at the very spot where the treasure is buried, he must of necessity discover it. But if this occurred always or frequently, (b, ii) would become a case of (b, i). Such necessity makes some people believe that there is no

7
Difference between these various cases of accidental cause, namely, that (b) is reducible to (a); (b, ii) either to (b, i) or to (b, iii): (b, ii) to (b, i) inasmuch as digging the well at this spot must result in discovery of the treasure already there; (b, ii) would be reducible to (b, iii) inasmuch as the man who so discovers the treasure would believe it was there so that he might discover it, as if he were the per se cause of this good fortune - for the fortuitous character of good fortune is soon forgotten. There is nonetheless all the difference in the world between (i) the necessity of following a muddy path to reach a certain place; (ii) to discover unexpectedly something worth while or harmful; (iii) to believe that there is an order of effect to cause, per se or per accidens, where there is nothing of the kind.

Now notice what can result from an easy confusing of one type of accidental cause with another. If the accidental cause termed chance (b, ii) be identified with that called removens prohibens (b, i), the result will at once be a case of causality, per se, necessary, yet utterly fortuitous in the sense of (b, ii). If I draw your chair away just as you are about to seat yourself, yet by some sort of curious reasoning can maintain that, though I foresee the result quite clearly, I do not in the least intend it, then I become per se cause of your fall, necessary cause of it, yet chance cause of it. Democritus seems to be in this position, since he holds that a concourse of atoms formed the whole universe by chance and that all happens of necessity. It is noteworthy that several pre-Socratics went so far as to see in chance (automaton) the

1. If we fail to obey this rule, the doctrine of final causality can be made to look grotesque, as Aristotle shows in *Physics*, II, c.8.

supreme universal cause, yet felt no need to analyse its nature. There is of course a sense in which chance, being ens per accidens, has no nature and is undefinable. This may be the reason they failed to analyse the notion of chance which is definable. But to proceed in this way is to attempt explanation of the known in terms of the unknown, of per se in terms of per accidens. This is precisely what we do when we say that order is the per se effect of disorder, and reason of unreason. And so we reverse the adage 'whatever is per accidens must be reduced to something per se.' Notice how the reverse of this statement may follow logically from its misinterpretation. For most authors, ancient and modern, understand it to mean that in a proposition like this one, 'Socrates was accidentally (cf. b, i) run down by a truck,' we are ignoring the per se causes of his death, namely, the mass and consistency of Socrates, his inattention, the weight and momentum of the truck, and so on, and that we thus overlook the fact that under these circumstances he could not fail to die. But this is a bad blunder. The term 'accidentally,' in our report of Socrates' fatal accident, overlooks nothing. Rather it acknowledges the truth that, in spite of the determinate reasons for his death, the fact remains that Socrates was unaware of what was about to happen as he crossed the street then and there. Any rational agent who cannot keep all circumstances under control is liable to be an accidental cause of the type (b, ii). The pseudo-explanation by means of no more than determinate cause (b, ii) is identified with (b, i); second, it is assumed that whatever happens necessarily (e.g., b, i) is a per se effect, as if, in our first example, the wish to reach a certain spot (a) were quite the same as the willingness to walk through mud (B). The whole point is that (B) is not per se intended, though inevitable, and even per se connected with (A). The truck is not the cause of Socrates' unfortunate end, though his death necessarily follows when it strikes him. Nor is the driver the per se cause, though he could see that Socrates was close for a few seconds before the actual impact. And it is a blessing that traffic courts appreciate this better than writers on philosophy.

Now let us see how 'whatever is per accidens must be reduced to something per se' can logically be turned into its converse. It is by reading per se causality into what is in fact accidental. The sophism here is more subtle. To illustrate, let us return to an earlier example: Socrates goes to the market place for the sole purpose of buying vegetables; he there chances upon a debtor of his whom he had wanted to meet all along. The usual analysis of this event is as follows: both Socrates and his debtor were bound to reach the market at such a spot and time, no matter what their respective intentions; so how could they fail to meet? The fortuitous character of this meeting seems swallowed up, as it were, by per se causes. But such an analysis is pointless, for it excludes exactly that which makes the meeting fortuitous (b, ii),

namely, the different reasons why Socrates and his debtor go to that place at that time, and their desire to meet or avoid each other if they knew where or how, and the absence of all expectation on the part of each that the encounter would happen then and there. Per se agency is of course present. But the duty of reducing the per accidens to something per se does not mean that in the end per se must replace it. The agent and his express purpose are essential here, while something, which he would pursue or avoid if he had foreknowledge, happens unexpectedly to what he intends, or in lieu of what he intends, in this particular action. In other words, the fortuitous occurs (1) to a per se agent who (2) would have acted for the sake of, or would have sought to avoid, something which happens outside of his intention. The encounter may be quite expected and foreseen by a third person who knows the intentions of Socrates and his debtor, and to this third party, will therefore not be fortuitous; but if he did not know that they did not intend or expect either to meet or avoid one another on this particular occasion, the third person would be ignorant of the encounter qua fortuitous.

Now, how can the converse of our adage come to be stated as a logical conclusion? It is simple enough. To reduce accidental causality in the fashion described, is actually to identify the two. The per se is watered down to per accidens. Let us recall the impossible enthymeme mentioned on an earlier page: since Socrates can meet his debtor just as effectively by chance as by design, it follows that everything can be accounted for by chance. Now an application of Occam's razor will be made: but whatever can be accounted for by chance requires no other cause. Therefore the proposition 'whatever happens per se is reducible to what is per accidens' should be preferred to its converse. Now, 'random mutations' means the same as 'mutations produced by chance'; therefore chance can account for all there is in nature. But does it? And, if so, how? What would be thought of a christian science forever ready with the pious declaration that everything found its explanation in the fact that God made it or could make it?

3. Explanation and possibility

There is nonetheless a sense in which science does have the duty of showing that a thing is possible. In geometry, for instance, it is possible to construct an equilateral triangle, which therefore 'exists.' In mathematics, constructibility implies existence; if our triangle is possible, if it can be constructed, then it is by that very fact a valid object of mathematical science. For instance, having constructed a plane triangle, it will now be possible to extend its base, which reveals that the exterior angle so produced is equal to the two opposite interior angles; from which we can now demonstrate that the angles of any plane triangle are equal to two right angles. This property follows necessarily from what a plane triangle is. In nature, however, possibility will not be quite of this kind, and will never of itself provide a basis for profitable reasonings. Anyone can see that elephants are possible, for example, but this possibility is known by hind-sight and throws no further light on what an elephant is, or how he is possible as we do the equilateral triangle, we would need to know its inner essential design and there perceive how such a beast can come to be. Even from such knowledge, which no doubt would need to draw upon the whole universe, we could never conclude that elephants do in fact exist. To achieve this conclusion we would have to show how, from previously existing things (A), elephants (B) necessarily proceed, on the assumption that if A, then B.

An analogy may clarify the distinction which I am trying to establish. There are two ways in which a man may know a motorcar. Without in the least understanding how it functions, he may own and drive one. He will then be quite aware that motor-cars are possible, for he has immediate experience of his own. But he will have knowledge of these machines in a very different sense, if he also knows how they function and how they are manufactured. Now the man who is satisfied with randomness without aim as sufficient explanation for the origin of species will be like a person who would find a sufficient reason for motor-cars in the simple fact that they exist. The latter individual may attempt to render his position more acceptable by arguing that no contradiction or impossibility is involved in the notion that random changes in ores might well result in the special metals and alloys needed for a motor-car; that random scrambling of these metals could explain the formation of the proper parts; and that further scrambling

2
could result in the final assembly of this convenient means of transportation. But does this sort of laboration really help? Surely its only function is to camouflage a basic position which remains unchanged: motor-cars are possible, they can be, and this explains the fact that they are. It explains nothing of course. Actually it is a statement that explanations are not to be sought.

Now if we are right to reject a pseudo-theory of this sort as accounting for motor-cars, why are we not right to reject a similar tale offered as explanatory of the nature and origin of species? Are the works of nature manifestly so much less intelligible than man's? And if they were, shall we diminish their obscurity by denying purpose in them? The fact is that to understand the simplest forms of life is harder for us than to grasp the structure and workings of our most complex machines, because there is in nature so much more to be known, so much more intelligibility than man can achieve. Natural Selection, as Darwin put it, "is a power incessantly ready for action, and is immeasurably superior to man's feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art." Perhaps we should ask ourselves if the very superiority of nature's works, and the consequent difficulty man must face in understanding them, have anything to do with tendencies to ruthless over-simplification, such as that which leads to a theory of unguided randomness as proper and sufficient cause of all natural things.

In fact, though, most knowledge of possibility in nature is of the hind-sight type, and even when we reach some understanding of concrete possibility we can never do away with the first. For instance, we know that there are planetary systems, and several hypotheses are in vogue to account for their information. Now suppose we eventually learned how they in fact came to be, as we know why eclipses occur; we would then understand how they are concretely possible, yet this possibility would not be the reason they exist, any more than the mere possibility of the universe can be the cause of its existence. Having shown that planetary systems are possible, we might see that they are necessarily possible - a possibility opposed to the impossible; but this is as much as we could hope for. The study of nature may therefore be viewed as progress from what is known to be possible because it is there, like an oak tree, toward understanding of the proper reason of its possibility - which is the same as knowledge of its causes. Still, it must not be forgotten that the latter possibility will never account for the fact, no matter how exhaustive the knowledge of all that is required for its possibility. Planetary systems or elephants remain contingent things, no matter how clear it may become that they can exist. All of which goes to show how essential it is to distinguish the possible as opposed to the necessary, from the possible as opposed to the impossible - and how easily the one is taken for the other.

Let us return to our random mutations. There is an analogy between throwing dice at random and the way nature produces individuals and new species, and analogy like that Darwin saw between conscious and unconscious selection. We observe random distributions of spores, and very few of these come to fruition. Now, is there anything unscientific in observing that without this huge waste there would soon be no mushrooms? Is it unreasonable to see that this is reasonable? Must we refuse to see that if nature did not resort to random mutations, new species would not arise? If nature's randomness is analogous to the sort we use on purpose, as in casting dice, we simply cannot identify it with accidental causality of the type (b, ii) without destroying the analogy. Both instances of the random, however, can be partly reduced to the accidental causality (b, i) inasmuch as no purpose determines which particular sperm will fecundate the ovum, or which pellet will strike the game - so far as my intention is concerned, any pellet will do. Lavishness and waste are part of a method used by both art and nature to defeat uncertainty in the face of cōtrariety - removens prohibens. Like the average hunter, nature is simply not equipped to achieve results with economy. There is no reason in the world why randomness in nature should not be purposeful.

It is interesting to note that they who seek in aimless random mutations a principle of natural selection, appeal nonetheless to a prior principle, namely, the 'struggle for existence.' Why should living things 'struggle' to exist? And what is meant by 'favourable' mutations? If these expressions are mere metaphors, why does science use them at all? If more direct language is impossible, we may surely ask why. The reader will remember that to make intelligible Leibniz's compossibles are invested with power

to lift themselves into existence, Lord Russell explained that "Leibniz seems to have imagined a sort of Limbo inhabited by essences all trying to exist; in this war, groups of compossibles combine, and the largest group of compossibles wins, like the largest group in a political contest." Empedocles, too, though he taught that order in nature is the product both of necessity and chance, nonetheless had recourse to Love and Strife as basic principles, but, like the Nous of Anaxagoras, they amount to no more than a deus ex machina.

There is a type of mind averse to any intelligibility we may achieve by granting purpose in nature, by granting, for example, that eyes were produced for the sake of seeing. It is obviously more simple to say that we can see because we have eyes, or can walk because we have legs. If a man is satisfied with the latter type of reason, if he frowns upon 'eyes are for the sake of seeing and are produced for that reason,' there is little to be done about it. But there is nothing to prevent us from understanding why he can find such a choice possible, just as we can account for Descartes' faith in a clarity which turns out to be utterly obscure.

Finally, it would be unjust to imply that all scientists scorn the notion of purpose in nature as scientifically perverse. Very eminent biologists, such as Lucien Cuenot and C. H. Waddington, and even physicists, such as Niels Bohr, maintain that living things are unintelligible without purpose.

CHARLES DE KONINCK.

Evolution

Mathematics - concept evolving -

Pythagoreans - Geometry: assume a point - make the line, move the surface limited of space. We are not satisfied in constructing a circle - Proper from the plain straight line to the circle -

~~Straight line~~ - conicoids

In study of nature: Empedocles - Hegel: our intellect wh. can produce all sorts of nature our mind can conceive -

Try to reduce reality to something simple & one - Ernst Cassirer on Individuum und Kosmos, Leipzig - (natural tendencies in the mind) -

That the polygon goes on and on to conicoid the circle does not imply a contradiction but that it reaches the circle does -

There are many species (hierarchy) -
We find satisfaction in relating one thing to another -

We want to see one thing in the light of another - or as generated from another - We will never another figure which reduced to a circle but we have a tendency to do as if it would -

Now is it that we are satisfied in imagining a straight line in the light of a circle - so that from a we can move on to b - ? - we want as if we had one ^{imagined} mode of knowing all things - But really we know by many means of knowing but this is an imperfection - We need as many means of knowing as there are things we know - distinctly - We know distinctly with distinct ways of knowing -

One & Many - on the parts of the things themselves -
One & Many - on the part of the knower -

God is not multiplicity because it would be an imperfection
God knows multiplicity & this is a perfection - God knows without composing and dividing - On the part of his knowing: but there is no multiplicity -

We know with distinct means - Intellect is divided in powers - simple apprehension, composition; third operation: infer something unknown from the known

The best thing we know are known only at the end of a very arduous
discourse -

None of the common principles can prove as previous -

X

X

Separated substances know distinctly different natures & are with
different in a single means of knowing. We have a tendency to get there -

X

Problem of evolution:

There is a hierarchy in nature - One kind of life tends to go up and finally man is generated.
A new type of living being is generated from a lower - without the lower the higher type would not exist -

the theory -

Progress from lower to higher according to law inherent to
Will this diminish the role of Divine causality -

Can 'man' become - can there be a coming to be of an individual man - What it is to be a man cannot be generated -
One absolute nature cannot be generated into another absolute nature.
∴ evolution will take place in an individual - It is not this kind of animal converted into this kind of animal but rather this animal of this kind ~~produces~~ ^{generates} this

Is it possible to have more in the effect than there is in the cause?
a higher form of life coming from a lower form of life? - Generatio aequivoca -

the Quintus -
yves - PKI.

Huxley: typewriting monkey's hypotheses - Monkeys typing at random -

rouel - Le Hazard

(2)

There is a nat. tendency ^{of the mind} in us to make reduction - but no absolute reduction is possible -

Empedocles - Heraclitus - Democritus - try to explain all the phenomena of nature in a strictly scientific way.

The most ancient ph. tried to explain natural things in form of what they are made of - material causality - Thales, Anaximander; Empedocles: 4 principles -

How could they believe to account for things in terms of material causality -

S. Thomas no 74 - Metaph. Phil. saw 4 different: that out of which the thing is constituted. Matter is principle of generation it gives rise to the making of the thing - per se it becomes the thing - thing becomes per se from their material cause. That into which a thing is resulted also has the aspect of principle. Thales: water is permanent throughout all, to change is principle - material cause - In between we have water but with different duration & - What is most permanent in the thing also has the character of principle -

Accidental modification. In such becoming there is no absolute becoming. No final simplification. Evolution then is very much accepted.

Matter - the wh. they are - that in wh. they formate - Empedocles: love & strife -

Things were always of something else than what they are -

Empedocles: love & strife - according to their first impression - projected into nature. Poked blind love & strife - What then makes love & strife act this way? - They are brought together by chance - this appetite for unity or division put into the hands of chance excludes an intellect from nature -

Anaxagoras: 2 first principles: mixture of all things & chaos - there is something of everything in everything -

Intellect - separated from nature - Intellect must be removed from the known - Intellect must be removed from nature - intellects Only intellect can be responsible for order in things.

Plat. Metaphysics
Lect. XII, 196-198

∴ There is an intellect -

Aristotle:

How are things made? remains to be studied by Aristotle - There is reason in the world accounting for the way things are - This can be shown - (Why is the hand so limber?) - this is philosophy - we do not stop at the Deus ex machina but try to find the proximate causes of things -

Anaxagoras:

No principle inherent to the thing - this is a denial of the principle we call NATURE. There is no nature.

Aristotle:

Wants nature to accomplish as much possible - by itself - He attributes to nature alone.

we cannot make nature

Nature is more perfect if it has in itself the principle of being what they are - intrinsic principle: more perfect.

Praises Anaxagoras who thought the good to be prime of all things - This good again becomes some sort of Deus²⁴/Machina.

How does the Noos produce order in things - this we will find out by studying nature here - Here is the Noos principle of things -

If you want to know a master, an artist, inspect his work -

See lessons 14, 15 of Ph. I.

Two points: all forms are contained in the potency that is matter -
None are pre-created -
In the self of the lowest of the creatures is contained -

2/ Matter is transcendently an appetite - potencies more -

Cartesius
St IV
ch. 22, 23

③
Lesson XIV - Bk I. Physics

Aristotle: { Nothing can come from nothing -
Nothing can come from what already is & simpler.
Aristotle: Something comes from something not in act but in potency.

S. Thomas:

nature: 'ordo generationis'
nature: 'per se per quod' means BIRTH
nature: 'ordo rerum': said firstly of FORM

non-being

- ①
- ② From a non-being ^{material} there is generation only per accidens.
- ③ Non-being can be said of Matter - Matter in potency -
Analogue form

e.g.: 'not man' is an infinite name; infinite names are not names - However non-being means something.

I did not make this distinction about non-being as an analogue form. If being had a universal meaning - then becoming would imply a contradiction. If being meant to be in act - then a thing would be before it becoming.

'Ens in potentia': subject to negation; to form; to an infinity of privation: negation of all the forms that can be in the subject.

Each thing in nature by reason of its subject can be understood as infinite - has something of infinity.

Aristotle:

pushed the infinite principle of all things - did not define separate from the intellect. He said this infinite steers all things. It is a kind of Providence - He pushed down Aristotle's theory of P.M. - so in a sense he is right.

This potency as potency for all proportional forms is infinite -
Only the human form does not become from a pre-existing ~~material~~ thing but is created.

Lesson XV.

Matter as potentia in and privation:

Every natural form is a participation in the divine Being. A thing is good insofar as it is in act.

In that case forms are good -

P.M. is an appetite - not an appetite like the one found in animals but it is an inclination for a good - form -

Matter is an app. for the form that it does not have and is possible - This appetite is innate act

P.M. is a cause of natural things per modum materiae - P.M. is cause of like the mother - ^{medium}

Privation is evil like the form is a good ^{appetible, divine} if you go further in your observation. This is an extreme.

The privation is dark?

The privation is not a constituent principle of the thing; it is there per accidens - The subject is deprived -

Privation is outside in act & in potentia. It is the non-in out of wh. nothing can come per se - (Same non-in in the ancients).

Participation
is an Analogous
Term

a part of something which in itself does not have the nature of whole - God is the ante partes

McV. 7. 10. 22. art 1 - ed 3

Cont. Jambles -

Totum { ex partibus

ante partes: God - { participation of being - complete being ad comparationem to God. They are good in themselves but in relation to God they are good as participation -

philosophia naturalis

Potentie: in the physical sense - in nature -
 Ex potencie statum non actus -

Perfection wh. is the object of appetite: perfectionem alterius per modum appetibilis.

(Perfection - Potentia - appetibile)

We must distinguish between perfection and matter. Not necessary to make perfection an evil - ~~non necessarium~~ -

P.M. - appetite is for the form. It does not have - it is because of a need of something else. [There is an appetite in God but it is not an appetitus in the primitive sense of the word]. I desire that my live because my friend is mortal - If he were immortal I would not desire that he live -

P.M. can not desire to be perfection -

It is manifest that P.M. is distinguished from the form (habitu) and perfection (non-habitu). It is impossible for perfection to desire form, it is P.M. wh. desires form - We can speak of appetite in P.M. What P.M. is to be an appetite -

P.M. = M. : ?

Rational : cause sui

9. The definition of P.M. in Aristotle is against Aristotle's -
 Nature acts for an end - Concrete examples of this is hard -
 The Ancients were real anthropomorphists - We know & hold
 that inanimate beings act for an end but we cannot point out
 the instances of them -
 Do things within themselves have a good? - Is it good for things
 to have motion? - Is it perfection?
 - Things are good when referred to living beings - E.g. : Rainfall
 is good or bad according to the effect it has on the crops etc -
 Electrical charges in themselves have no goodness whatsoever;
 referred to ~~some~~ living beings they are useful etc -
 Rational beings are Cause of the existence of things of this
 universe - The inanimate world is ordered to the animate world -

Final Causality is most obscure cause of natural things can not
 be pointed out -

P.M. cannot exist without a form - (P.M. co-exists).
 P.M. desiring a form, this form is another one from the one
 it already has. P.M. is ordered to a form; it has appetite for
 a good; it knows the good towards which it tends or is ordered
 by something else - E.g. (analogy) : arrow \rightarrow Target
 archer

Now is it that everything in the world does not happen like
 the water running down the land slide? No intellect is needed.

There is a final cause, there must be an agency. This final
 Cause is prior in the knowers & ultimate in execution.

Potency \rightarrow act : "naturalis appetitus"

P.M. -	<u>Appetite for an infinity of forms</u>	Intellect
for:	- physical unity	intentional unity
	- more app. for a more perfect form	Knowledge of the more perfect form
	than for a lower one.	
	Similarity between P.M. and the	Similarity between the intellect
	form it desires.	what it desires.

12 October

Course 5

15

Causality in the good -

Bonus diffinitionem sui : "efficiency" - by moving the agent to act.

Final cause does not produce but moves - Motion is something physical -

Causality characteristic of "that for the sake of which" was discussed by Aristotle -

A special cause - final cause - must account for the good of things -

If there were not determinate cause to account for the good of things we would have to suppose that their good happened accidentally.

All the usefulness found in nature would be purely casual -
(Causa - causa per accidens indeterminata etc -)

For a thing to happen by chance, it has to be completely irrational + unforeseen.

A final cause must be a cause before it exists, it must somehow persist - It must have an intentional ~~from~~ ⁱⁿ existence - This is why we require intellect - the causality owing to that intellect the only - Speaking of the ^{material} appetite of our own intellect we need refer to the final cause - In the things the lack knowledge + act for an end there must be an intellect guiding it. Every work of nature calls for an intellect. The final cause does not direct one action separately from that of the other cause but directly of the other -

How is the intellect present in the thing that acts for an end?

The importance of good and intellect in nature without which there would not be action for good - i.e. no good. These are essential to the definition of nature - It is the goodness we know by induction that gives a reason to call upon to an intellect that explains action for a good.

Corruption ex parte materialis comes from matter + necessity.

Intellect itself is an appetitus naturalis which is a potestas potest potentiality ordered to the truth - It is the very pot - of the intellect itself. This is how we say that intellect wants to know - This desire is pot to knowledge - This appetitus is the NATURE of the INTELLECT -

Reputationes Sophisticae - Aristotle.

De Poetica, Q. 4. Art 1 - ad 2.
S. Thomas -

*Appetitus naturalis: habitudo ad formam secundum
quod materialis*

Even if the intellect cannot account for truth it can
see it for our intellect has a natural appetite for the truth -
No insight here so a philosopher could not have only there
That knowledge though is not to be despised - To be certain we
must account for the truth we hold, see.

Metaphysics (Pt I, lesson 6 -
no. 107

It is said that a philosopher will ~~be~~^{but} ~~be~~ upon the truth.

Physics II. Chance:

Socrates goes to the market etc. ~~meets~~^{meets} his debtor etc. - by chance -
The ~~general~~ desire of Socr. to meet his debtor is analogous to the desire
of the intellect to know the truth.

When the philosopher hits upon truth by chance: 1) reaching the
truth without reason is not as much ~~staying~~ as Socrates ~~seeing~~ his money
because ~~man~~ ~~reasons~~ properly, he reaches ~~certainty~~.

The ~~philosopher~~ - found ~~them~~ should be 3 ~~pieces~~ - but they could
not prove it - Arist. - proves it.

Metaphysics I lesson 12 -
194

The appetite of Matter - + some appetite - appetite must be a
similitudo of that which is desired. In the appetite there is something
that resembles this particular perfection.

P.T. I^a II^a -

previous reference

We must distinguish the similitude in the case of representation:
in the knower; possession of similitude can be the end; the knower is in
possession not in the ~~affection~~ knower -

I^a II^a Q. 27. ad 4

In appetite the thing itself - the good itself - is the term

In as much as the will has an inclination to the thing which it
is ~~for~~ ~~von~~ ~~reference~~

In intellect - la similitudo est le terme -
L'appetit ~~est~~ ~~est~~ ~~est~~ - la similitudo est le principi section

This similitudo essential in appetite - this similitudo has
the nature of principle and as such is called 'good' - The good
for wh. there is appetite exists in the appetite. The appetite
is weighted towards this good -

True secundum proportionem -

In the knowledge
of the universe, the one
who is about who speaking
of the knowledge of the universe

If we remain in the truth reached like did the ancient
philosophers about the prime of nature - by necessity - we are
not philosophers - People with those insights cannot discuss
but with ^{other} people who also have these insights.
Aristotle: internal sense distinguishing the external
sensation - Internal sense makes the judgement
about external sensation.

P.M. is one and is many according to diff. ways -
How can something become absolutely? - P.M. is the subject
in becoming but not the subject that comes - O.M. is neither
compossible nor genuine - Lem 12-13 - in bk I of Physics -

Leibniz's error
comes from -

Similarity in knowledge - similarity in appetite -
All things in nature have appetite not all have
knowledge - In being that know the similarity is the term -
We first know by similarity + then "tabula rasa" -
The similarity is not superadded to the power which
has a special determination which is not distinguished absolutely
from the power (intellect) itself.
There is a power in act. The agent intellect is always
in act (in the child the agent intellect is in act but is not
performing anything). (Plato's error: well known by peni-
nisanon. This is a profound error).

Ordo ad actum is the potential itself -
We want something before we know something -
The will, in the contrary, is an appetite that follows upon knowledge.

Q. 14, art 16

Abd

Bk II, lesson 12, no 1 -

If all main tenet that 'whatever is' is by chance we
would never have to recourse to intellect to explain nature.
Nature is among the things that act for an end -
If nature act for an end it is necessary that ~~it is~~
it be ordered by an agent intellect.

Lesson 14. no 8 end -

Nature is nothing but a nature - ^{order} - ~~order~~ in virtue
of ~~order~~ an intellect it moves to an end - Nature is
a work of divine act. ~~Nature is a form~~
Omnis potentia est ordinata ad actum is verified every where

Matter - form : comp- constitute 'what the thing is'
we distinguish between 'what —' + its existence -
Existence has the aspect of act with respect to any created essence
There is always a proportion between "what a thing is"
+ "the thing" -

(Continue) In the Physics we know there is must exist an ^{agent}
intellect but we do not know that it is a separated intellect.
We cannot divorce nature as acting for an end without
seeing it as ~~is~~ directed by ~~an~~ divine intellect - It is
in the divine intellect that we will see nature determined
se

Spirited substances know nature a priori : derived
from God + not from things themselves. The knowledge
of God goes toward the things + not from them - In
this way Aristotle says that God does not know the
things in themselves -

- P. Matter is an appetite - In one way P. matter is one in
another it is many P. Matter is not in pot - to some forms
where it has had - It is only in pot - to forms where
it has not already been subject.

References to J. 1. 1. 1.

De Virtutibus Q. 22 art 1. ad 3 - ! The more an appetite divine perfective the more appetite there is.

Oct. 18.

- From our induction of the good in nature we arise here reason to a divine intellect: rational entities.
- In P.M. good nature is a participation of the actuality to which it is an appetite - Inasmuch as it is an appetitive power we must have in it the divine intellect which causes it.
- This ratio — should not be concluded as placed in ~~matter~~ ^{things} by God, at the beginning or henceforth they would move towards an end. Unless God was actually the cause of things here & now, we'd lapse into nothing. God is not only the cause of generation-creation - God is the absolute universal cause which keeps causing all along. God: causa conservans res in esse.

script de Dieu avec causes:
 - O. 4 - act 1.
 - two editions -
 Th - Comment on S. John
 I, lessons,
 E, lesson 2.

While God is the cause of everything that the effect is - Causa causal est causa causati -

When we say that nature acts for an end we say this of matter & form! How does matter act for an end? - what acts is the composite - That in virtue of which the comp. acts is both matter & form - Form is a good. Nature is said of absolute first principle but the comp. of matter & form are already an effect -
 If it acts for an end it is in form of matter & form appetites -

Democritus & Empedocles cannot be called materialists - A purely mechanical ~~universe~~ world there are no problems -

Force in which matter is one - is many!

Matter is many:

Plurality of individuals - Plato's matter is in part - to many forms - Matter as principle of individuation is many, as many as there are individ. subst.
 If we take away the of matter as principle of quantification we have one matter but this is abstraction.
 Matter as quantified: many.
 Matter as more is many - for it is in possession of all other forms it could have: in this sense this matter is not pure more or capable of other forms for if it remained more in this sense, this matter

Prof Kenneth Heck -
 I in Greek Philo-
 sophy of Aristotle

would acquire their forms & still be ruin -
 One is not saved the same way of matter &
 of form - Unity of matter is very diff. to point out -

I. Q. 66. art 2 - Apparent contradiction :

Is matter indifferently disposed to all the forms it can
 have? It seems it is indifferent -

[Thy about the angels: their matter is in potency ^{only} to the
 forms they actually have - The potency is not exhausted by the form

Matter desires - there is appetite only in as much as there
 is some order to the thing for which there is appetite.

When a form of one thing is in another, ^{matter} incompletely.

There must be in P.M. a similitude of human nature ^{form}.

There must be an incomplete one of the human form -

As matter is subj. to a more perfect form -

Spiritualibus creaturis =

Anaxagoras: anything can come from anything.
 P.M. receives form according to a certain order -

Deinde - d. 22
 art 1.
 ad 3

Philosoph. XII -
 27. 29

Procession generationis dispositionis / matter - degree & higher forms -

Vetus : example of evolution -

Amicia vegetabilis ; Amicia sensitiva ; Amicia intellectiva or intellectiva : human being.

In the 'embryo' we still say ^{it's} the life is vegetable, then sensitive - then intellective.

The vegetative soul is not in potency to the intellective soul - Matter with no form is in potency to the higher form.

The ultimate end of all generation is the human form. It is this form towards which all matter tends. "Evolution of the embryo" this underlying the conception of the embryo is —

St. Th. is talking about P.M. & appetitus materialis propter formam etc —. If this appetitus moves forward there must be an intellect.

Ch. 23.

*
next
time.

Nilhil enim → ^{*} item enim ^{notum} gaudet & ex hoc —
→ ad unum finem → a patet —
last paragraph - : non differt actum -
Etiam

Every agent intends to produce its like - E.g.
the shoe maker has some idea of the shoe -

St. Th. requires intellect. There must be an intellectual cause - The celestial bodies, ~~sympliciter~~
The form of motion : human form soul - There must be some intellectual agent causing the whole process of generation leading up to man.

How does this intell. agent act in nature
Whether there is cool. or not we stand in need
of a rational agent - of an intellectual agent.
Whether we have ~~any~~ equivalent generation ;
agent -

Margie
Leaf covers

Nov. 9 -

interviews (Sk II,

18
Causes - differ in species from the effect -

In univocal caus. - : univ. causality -

There are basic propositions in S. Th. that can be
use to prove evolution. If there is such a thing -

Essential cause always differs from its effect
and always presuppose an agent cause -

Univocal causality that explains even univocal
causality [Kant puts the univocal causality in our own
reason - instead of nature - reality.]

Argument - "Why should the essential cause always differ in
kind from its effect?"

1st position - A

'Order of causes' order of causation establishes
unity in the universe. Order of dependence exists
in the order of operation.

2nd position -

You can show that no nature can possibly create.
God creates things immediately though each thing ^{created}
still has its own cause - Only God can be the per se
cause of a thing created - Not only angels but even
our own soul cannot come to be by way of generation.

The compound comes to be as to its form too.
If we say matter comes to be "simpliciter" -
P.M. has to be created -

"The first man, first lion have been created
by God" - ~~homo non~~ "A man can only be generated
by a man" - depends what you mean by
generation. Do we mean univocal? equivocal?

In God there is generation - Son is like of
the Father is either by complete - : both are God -
This is the most perfect form of generation: ad intra -
Univocal generation is the one that resembles the
most this generation in God -

Why should? - proceeds per modum simpliciter - In the
order of knowledge we act in the simpliciter - In the
order of love - love is the principle → the good -

Equival generation
thruout generation

like produce like

God Causality not outside universal cause - due
to order of operation - ~~cannot~~ nature -

God causes - in the cause intimately.
God is more the cause of the effect than the proximate
cause of the effect.

[There is only one thing of which we
can be first causes: evil.]

Esse is what is first in the thing;
its ultimate reality. God only can be cause of
Esse.

It is thanks to the causality of the ^{universal} human species that there can be this union between
Socrates & his son - thanks to that we can have a
universal cause. Causality of the secondary cause
is strengthened by the first cause though the
secondary cause is not diminished.

God does not need secondary causes;
why does he use them? - If God has recourse to
second cause - it is due to ^{the} dignity -
Dignity? - bonitas propter se - Every triple gift
shews in the dignity of God as he is a cause.

If there is evolution - this is a sign of
to what extent God has communicated dignity to
Nature.

ad quantum solum

Distrib. 18 - Q. 2 art 1 - corpus:
ad #, 4, 6, 7

Purpose: essential causality must always be
different in species from its effect.

Page 10

Why must an equal & unequal cause?


We have recourse to an equal cause -
Every unequal cause requires an equal cause -
We cannot have a lower form of life going up
to a higher cause form of life -

Tu 7, act 1 - De Potentia -

Socrates is the unequal cause of his son but
both are human being - They share something in
common - A physical community - there is
a univocal in re in both - Socrates cannot
be the cause of what he has in common or the
his son for then he would be the cause of
himself - There is a universal cause which
is the proper cause -

Socrates does generate Socrates junior
but is not the per se cause of what Socrates
junior and himself have in common - It will
be caused by an unequal non universal cause -
Where ~~existing~~ a real physical intuitive
community -

The universal cause can be called instrumental
Cause in a broad sense - Socrates is an instrument
concomitant of the generation of a species -



Not every cause inferior to the effect will be
an instrumental cause -

Universal cause = architect -

Socrates is the per se cause of this particular

human nature in this particular individual -
If we abstract from Socrates,
we expect what they have in common.

Universal projector can not account
fully for the effect as to what it has in
common with the cause -

God has to be the cause of all
miscellaneous cause -

Universal cause can be said
of something which is not universal in itself -

In the order of efficiency every
universal cause is also sequential

Type -

In Socrates: Two proper effect; 1st -
relates to Soc. as to humanity in this matter;
2nd - proper common effect to a common cause

If there were no sequential cause
we could say of Socrates he can produce
anything - there would be no reason
for Socrates to produce man rather than
something else -

The proper effect of the ^{superior} cause is
superior to the cause -

Common effect must be reduced to
common cause - Example



opportunity has nature

Purpose: essential causality must always be different in species from its effect -

Reading:

Contra Gentiles - Bk II: ch 21

Ch 21 -
Effects are proportionate to their causes -
It is the esse that is first caused - its cause is the first universal agent: God -
The other (subordinate) causes - cause the esse hoc - Esse simpliciter is only created -
Creation is an action proper to God

Quicquid est instrumentum

In univocal generation: all inferior agent causes must be reduced into superior causes as instrumental into primary -

Every substance but God has its being caused by some other -

It is impossible that the cause of the esse be as instrumental and agent in virtue of passus another -

Instrumental causes only per viam motum -

Creation is not movement -

No other substance but God can create -

Quod est secundum

That which is caused according to some nature cannot be the cause of this nature (Socrates's son is not the cause of humanity) - It would be its own cause if it is cause of this nature in hoc -

Bk IV - ch 65.

Nallum particulare agens —

It is impossible to say that the particular universal agent (e.g. man) can be the principle cause of its species. If it was so this man would be the cause of all men and his own cause.

§ We say this man causes this man -
This man is cause of this man is as much
he is the cause of the form of man becoming
in this matter - principle of individuation -

No man + no other universal agent
in nature is cause but of the generation
of this or this thing -

Nov. 16 -

General argument to show that an essential cause must always be different in species from its effect -
That no man can be the cause of the human species -

— An effect must be ~~ad~~ proportionate to its cause -
A common effect requires a common effect -

via 6 De Potestate

These things must have a
divine cause of what they
are in common -

x

x

Abstr -

If a thing is contained in a genus, it cannot be the cause of all
in that genus -

IV^a Vic -

The maximum in any genus is cause of everything in that genus
∴ Contradiction

Response - Genus

Summa contra 9.1) e.g. animal - The cause of animal has to be something extrinsic -
efficient cause ∴ requires a universal cause.

10^a Vic 2) whatever is maxime tale is the cause of all the rest;
genus; unum proportionem -

Is cause not as a member of the genus but as cause of what
all the members of that genus have in common.

The order is neither in the sense of 'predicable' nor
'physical' -

Whenever you have a magis et minus ^{you need} ~~to~~ a 'maximum'
until you reach a 'simpliciter maximum tale' -

The cause of all in the order must be outside of it - we
still require a cause outside the order which account for it -
We need an efficient cause -

The 10th v. 12 does not refer strictly to the formal causality, for then we would end with God as the formal cause of all things -

There is a community between Socrates + Plato by reason of their individuality - They are specifically one and individually many - There is a specific identity between them -

identity { numerical : Socrates is Socr -
specific : Socrates + Socrates 2
generic : Socrates + Homer
proportion : Socrates, Gabriel } to be distinguished as against

Every numerical cause to produce its effect requires an equivocal cause in any sense - the cause of what is common either generically, specifically & proportion has to be outside this order -

Universal cause -

There must be intelligent creatures in the world - The agent produces its like -

Pr. 17 -

So far - there is such a thing as absolute becoming -
all things that become are somehow pre-contained in
the universe in potency - P.M. is strictly an
appetite for a good -

In the world P.M. is primarily an
appetite for the human form - If it is a true potency
in as far as there is an actuality for this pot.
there must be some agent sufficient to confer
this act -

In universal generation we need an
equivalant cause too -

When we say P.M. is primarily an
appetite for the human form - But is n't this
purely accidental : is it essential to have
an intellectual, rational creature?

Would a creature containing only irrational
beings be possible? Creation: the work produced -
If we take creation as a word is it essential
that there be rational creatures?

Is the intellectual creature essential
in the genre?

- Summa Contra Gentiles

There has to be intellectual creatures in the world

Disproportionately What is the function of intellectual creatures in the world:
If Arguments of demonstration : impossible for God
to create a world without intellectual creatures -

Couldn't God make an imperfect universe for
intellectual creatures are necessary for a perfect universe?
Couldn't he not have made a universe containing no intellect
in it -

Reading : There has to be some kind of optimum perfection
in God's creation. The effect is not perfect when
it is assimilate to the principle.
Circles : simply an exemplum - the
argument still holds -

What will a *videtur ad principium* include -
Assimilation in the principle: e.g. artist & horse -
The horse will be more perfect as it resembles the
conception in the mind of the artist -

God is creator by intellect & will; it is only
by intellect that there can be assimilation -

Amplius - second perfection fall upon principle -
If there is no assimilation in God as to operation there
would be not perfection according to perfection -

Could God do without operations?

If the optima perfectio of the universe is to be attained
then there must be intellectual creatures -

Adhuc - If the universe is to be perfect it is not
enough that things be good but they must be
be caused in their being - Super abundance of the creature
So it begins -

Assimilation will be perfect as to the very modes
of action will be through will and if there
is will there is intellect - Some creatures must be

Amplius -

Argument -

If there are cause and effect, the form of the
effect must be present in the agent somehow -

There is no perfect assimilation here.

Influence between the artist conception and the art
but material in the way -

Where there is

Esse intelligibility is the form of the —

[Art: *recta ratio, factibilium*

Next the one who ~~represents~~ *represents* *values* *peace* *values*
is not comparable of to the one in moral *values* *peace* *values*
E.g.: artist making a monster —]

Perfect union inasmuch as it resembles God -

What when the generated is more perfect than generating principle : son more perfect than the father ? what then ? how should he return to the principle ?

— We must refer to sympneumatic Cause -
This is when we get a better mind -

Prima perfectio : is the one in the agent

Secunda perfectio : is in the shoe -

2. God then from his own intelligibility -

Secundum naturam other would be
no difference between God + creature -

De Potestate Qu. 3, art 7
5, art 1

Conti - Jumb. BK II, ch 21 - adhuc effectus + following paragraph -
per - : item quod est

BK III, ch. 65 - per - item nullum particulare
BK IV - ch. 7

De Veritate - Qu 10, art 13, ad 3.

De Potestate - Qu 7, art 7 - ad 7

Questions ??

Et ideo oportet quod generans univocum
sit quasi agens instrumentale respectu ejus
quod est causa primaria totius speciei.

Natura communis?

How can a cause be universal?
"The agent produces its like!"

On dit qu'un vrai philosophe est celui qui
cherche la vérité 'for its own sake' -
N'est-ce pas là de l'égoïsme

I am a
Tabula rasa

like a white sheet of paper

That's what the soul of
a baby is supposed to be. - a
blank blackboard.

Nov. 30 -

of more or less spiritual
Perfect imitation requires that the object itself be spiritual.
Esse spirituale in the mind of the artist - or spiritual only, fulfilled or perfect imitation
Bk III, ch. III - 112

Intelligent creatures who are causa sui
direct themselves to their end - other creatures
are ordained to these

The army is ordained to victory - the soldiers
to the fight in the army -

God is the ultimate end of the universe
and must be known and loved

Only the nature of the intellect can 'participate'
in the universe - all the others are because of it -

Causa -

Multiplicity of Intellectual substances 'in commun':
If there is a material world there has to be intellectual substance
for the material world cannot be for the sake of separated
substances - They are for the sake of man as to all that
they are -

Nature is our vast attempt to achieve thought - and to
think, feel and —

A material world with no rational creature would be
a world with no purpose -

Ad modum productionis creatorum

God makes the universe to manifest his goodness -
creation is secondary. God creates to communicate his own
goodness - for the goodness that can be achieved by the creature -

God does not see the things that he could do in his power -
The ultimate term is the goodness of God himself to his hand
by the creature -

God as
final cause

ratio artificis → : me

ratio gubernantis ∴ there is a ratio additio ad principium
→ God

ratio artificis is impossible without the ratio gubernantis

It is God's own goodness that moves Him to produce -
communicate Himself to the creature -
It is always by way of annihilation to Himself that
the creature arrives at perfection -

Like the annihilation of the known by the knower -
An annihilation to God will not only be secundum naturae
but also secundum cognoscendi - by knowledge -
To know God requires intellect - knowledge sufficient to
lead one to God -

|| "Redditio to divine goodness, per bonum" - A redditio
has to come about some time extrinsic or intrinsic of nature -

In modis decem ordinatis habetudo secundum et ultimam -

If we have 3 terms - the third will imitate the
second in the way the second imitates the first - There will always be
imitation of habetudo -

E.g.: God contains all creatures "simplici modo" - God
in all creatures: ideas -

The int. creature is one that can contain all creation in
a similar way that God contains ideas -

Thence to this all embracing conception in the intellect
there is a further annihilation of the intell. creature in
God -

+

+

BOOK IV - ORDER OF THINGS TO GOD -

It is when considering creation as ordered to God that we
will have to point in that nature - Without which God would
not create -

Ratio gubernantis: the order of execution -

"providentia: the actual execution -

[*] Pars - Q. 22 - art 1 - ad 2 -
[*] Q. 93 - art 1 -

Ratio: infallible gubernatio of God as imputed in creation -
not in the work absolutely by looking at things directed to God -
God infallibly achieves his end -

There is an appeal to god from contingent as contingent -
God governs all things - The rational creat. will
be only to provide in a special way: Perfective nature -
dignitas finis -

Dignitas: finitas propter se. (good on its own account)

S. Th. attaches free action to the ^{nature} ~~personality~~ of
man. ^(not to his dignity)
Rational ~~creature~~ ^{being} is dignity count in this that he alone can
attain the term of the universe by lost knowledge -

We must consider the ratio specialis by which
rational creatures are governed + " " "
irrational creatures are governed -

The irrational creatures are governed for the sake
of rational creatures - If God had made only irrat-
creatures he would be governing for no purpose
he would create with no purpose at all -

The rational creature is governed by God for
its own sake. There is no cause for the irrat. creat.
for their own sake -

A tool is not sought for its own sake - its sole
purpose is to be used - Who can use the irrational as
a tool? - any cause for the irrat. - will be for the sake
of the principal agent - the end of the principal agent is
the purpose of the tool -

Omnia artificialia - are ordained to man himself -
Man is the principal agent of all our artificial supply even
computers -

Conclusion The irrational is ordained to the rational creature as
to its principal agent - They serve for something else -

Only the intell. creatures are governed for
themselves - they are governed for their own good -

The point of the argument: all creatures other than the rational -
are servile and for the sake of something else - No servus
without a master - dominus - i. They would not be

if the rational creatures did not exist -
To what are the in - platives to lord which
are other than God - We need masters to
account for the multitude of in. creatures -

[In the natural order though we are
absolutely inferior to the separated substances]

December 1st

p. 363 -

Amplicius. Quodcumque sunt aliqua -

There are many ways of knowing and loving God.
Only the ^{intellectual} ~~highest~~ creature can be made for itself.

Man is naturally dependant upon one another
that is why one man would not be sufficient
Man is social -

[It seems ~~as if~~ the angels would be frustrated
if there were no rational creatures for they could
not manifest themselves ad extra. ∴ in some way
there is a subordination of the intell. subst.
to the rational creatures -]

In a universe where there are intellectual
creatures all others are ordered to those -

Argument :

It is ^{good} manifest that all parts are
ordered to the perfection of the "totius".
The whole is not ~~the~~ ^{the} parts but the
parts are ^{for} the whole -
The whole is the good of the parts -

The intellect. creatures have a greater
affinity to the whole than do the others.

Affinity to the whole ?

McVittie
Q. 2 -

- A thing is perfect (good) in two ways :
- 1) more ~~than~~ according to the perfection of its ^{own} species.
E.g. Trees for instance, are absorbed in themselves
An individual man as to nature is better
than an individual tree.

If we look at things in themselves, as they are

Reputation in Q. 5 - I Pass. by Sancti St. Thomas -
is very good -

locked in themselves - all of them have the nature of parts -

There is another mode - other than the entitative mode - of perfection -

The soul in a man is all things as capable of knowing all things -

According to this mode the perfection of the whole universe is possible of existence is the one that knows the whole - The order of the whole universe is disordered in it -

of — We are using this text to show the affinity to the whole universe -
x x

What the word perfection means? - parts for the whole?

There is affinity in as much as they - intell. can annihilate the universe -

Even the angel must be smaller than others

If there were no intell. substances there would be no affinites of the universe to the universe -
Dispositive affinity between nature & intell -

The affinity of P.M. is at the very opposite of the affinity of the intellect -

The appetite of P.M. is precisely an appetite for the human soul -

The intell. creature uses non-intell. things for its own sake -

liberal
act. Therefore things other than man - man can express the work of his mind in a sense -
To produce an artificial thing is

'explicare': unfold it out -

In the case of man the non-intell. creatures are necessary for the sustenance of man -

All the things inferior to man are for the sake of man - of his spiritual constitution -

Suite December 1 -

Pk IV - 97
De Potentia - 3.85 -

December 7

Evolution is for the sake of rational substance

p 364

Dicitur - Quod aliquis propter se facit, —

pro se: in the narrow sense of the word, pro se est, semper est -
Pro se: something willed for itself is perpetual - All else is willed
for what is ultimate -
Propter se: pro se-intended for its own sake & only what is
intended for its own sake is perpetual.

How can we say intellectual substances are incorruptible
and unchangeable?

— ~~They~~ have immutable operations (!...) besides their
incorruptibility. These are immutant operations: self-love -

They are governed propter se and all other things for the sake
of intellectual substances - Without these creatures the world
would be utterly absurd.

Perfection of the universe: we must here consider the universe
as an appetite - In each part of the universe there must be
an appetite for the good of the whole universe -

All irrational natures ^{have a natural} ~~have a natural~~ appetite for the rational substance.
Rational nature: are the perfection of all irrational substance.
E.g.: stone - elephant's matter etc -

Queen Pasture

"World of firmaments"

[God creates to manifest his goodness - He is manifested
only in intellectual substance.]

[The Angels are fixed with good & evil, truth & falsity
and therefore have a potential contradiction.]

[Evil is natural - desire is natural - what we call
misery in nature it - we can be very anthropomorphic]

Harrington - on Elephants - 1959 -

* The irrational can be for 2 things: for the perfection of the universe
for the rational creature

On his autism good —

God made the person for his own sake -
the damned are not for their own sake - it would be a
contradiction for it would be better that he had never been born.

The old person is useful to himself else -

On his autism —

He is in his —

Cruelty is always in reference to man - It shows
a deformity in the man who is cruel -

P. Th. has pointed out how essential rationality is -

L

L

First -

SK IV - ch. 11 -

Various degrees of emulation -



Number 14-

Sk IV - ch. 11 -

Emanation: go outside the dwelling in

Degrees of emanation

There are degrees of emanation in things according to their perfection - The higher the nature the more intimate is the emanation -

In the inanimat we have to do with externalism, One thing acts upon others -

In the animate - the production is from the interior - Their motion comes from within -

'a principis copulacivitate' - Things that cannot move themselves are utterly deprived of life -

The oak tree forming 'seed' - 'seed' is principle intrinsic to the tree while it is being formed and then is extrinsic coming ~~from~~ the tree -

Perfect emanation requires semel habito secundum Speciem

The Emanation in plants is imperfect -

Emanation has its principle outside of that from which something emanates - A tree comes from a tree which was there because of the disposition of the ground -

A plant can be seen as a point of emanation - Emanation is more perfect when more intimate -

Emanation of the intellect reflecting upon itself is a more perfect one -

In the sense, the sense responds to the sensible - the sense becomes the sensible inasmuch as it is sensing - emanation emanates from the sense -

Qu. 84 - art 6 -

["In evolution, nature tries to get away from itself - when there is no emanation inside - most natural determinations the evolution - nature wants to get out of its sheer interiority] -

The ^{most} natural emanation is the highest?
The most natural is also divinum -

Why should the primum secundum ~~be~~ intellectus
be the most perfect? - Because I know that I know -
This is a perfectus iste because it is reflection -
Supremus + perfectus primum iste: human intellect
angelic intellect ^{eternus}
God - ad intra alter by

The best we can have in nature is the reflection of the
intellect of man -

The human intell. depends upon something extrinsic
to it: Nutrition, Phantoms;

The intellect of the angels does not depend on its
knowing by something extr. - it does not have to be
moved by what it knows - There is a distinction between
the principle of emanation + their subst. The emanation
is imperfect - All from within in God: God's knowledge
is a perfect emanation - He knows the creatures in
himself -

We have a more perfect emanation - in the emanation
in the intellect which is ad intra

Two kinds: ad extra : God → creation

ad intra : God's self-love -

Procession from outside to within

from within to outside

from within to within e.g.: knowledge - more
perfect in intellect.

[1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21th 22th 23th 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 37th 38th 39th 40th 41st 42nd 43rd 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th 50th 51st 52nd 53rd 54th 55th 56th 57th 58th 59th 60th 61st 62nd 63rd 64th 65th 66th 67th 68th 69th 70th 71st 72nd 73rd 74th 75th 76th 77th 78th 79th 80th 81st 82nd 83rd 84th 85th 86th 87th 88th 89th 90th 91st 92nd 93rd 94th 95th 96th 97th 98th 99th 100th : Gradus vitae .]

We can see in the degrees of emanation much instances
that every act tends to communicate self as much as possible.

Is it the same thing that "bonum est diffusivum sui"

In nature: we see there a tendency for self communication
ad intra = gradus vitae superiores - No only towards generation +
reproduction - Generation has a provisional character in nature.
Considering nature as tending towards a communication with
itself - Internal more life terminates ad extra - What is
distinctive of man is that he talks verbally - imperfect
for he cannot say all things to himself at ~~once~~ ^{once} -

Intellect. creatures are necessitated in nature - Another
reason why they are emanated to God ad extra.

To turn { ex partibus → one of the universes
ante partes → one of the parts

God exists before heaven & earth. We attain
God "ante partes" : fullness of perfection - It is a part of the
universe of which not one can

Two fold order in things for 1st of the intellect can
know universal - leading -

[Causal - semi rational] the contingent is not in itself essential.
The contingent falls short of

This contingency is to the intellect creature

In Veritate 11.13.

Metaph - Ph. 6 11.3 -

Miss de la
Koch
defined according to
his response

a very special reason that leads it to wisdom of God -
God is the per se cause of all - Only intellect
can be cause of contingent events -
The immediate cause is always contingent.

God is a per se cause qualified inasmuch
as he produces subordinate contingent causes -
& contingent effects - ends -

If God did not want them to be contingent
effects there would be no room for contingent effect.

Fortune: accord. cause w/ respect to condition -
among things that happen for an end by
a human.

Meeting a fortune: good or evil - to every man
is a good -

E.S.: ^{locution}
^{from the market} Infinity: 'in parte speciei causal
2/
3/

III -
Socrates

Nature cannot be said to be the per se cause
of contingent event -

There is a great deal of contingency in God's creation.
The fact that intell. caus. can lead to the per se
cause of contingency - allows for a complete 'prae-
ad principium' - There is unity in the world -
God is manifested in his world in a special way -

in bono
co homines sunt facti et ne different
e. e. que de plus on minus -

Natural absurdity: that we are mortal.
Exceptional absurdity: Cyano de Byrnes more -

argue -

It is only in rational creature that in contingency
takes place a 'prae- ad principium' - Even
contingency to make this 'prae- ad principium' necessitates an
intellect. There has to be an intell. intrinsic
to nature that relates it to its principle -
Nature can relate only

in Socrates
ch. 74

January 4 -

Chance in this universe - fortuitous encountering -

Thanks to the intellectual nature this contingency can be returned - relate all to the universal cause - *Redditiō ad principium* to the cause which answers for all accidental causes without being subject to contingency -

- Read in bk III - ch. 74-76

All this hold of the created intellectual substances -

Potential - Q.

Art 18 - ad principium

Man is the cause of all possible reality - We come about last of all but we were first intended -

God is not ourselves -

Thanks to man there is a "*redditiō ad principium*" - not only of nature - It is something for us to 'glorify God' - it is more for man than for an angel - We are surrounded by contingency, there is not a simple proper principle of ~~anthropology~~ ethics - sometimes a man virtuous man cannot pay his debt - for instance when to pay a debt he must kill someone -

eternal justice bk IV - last ch.

: All material world is for the sake of the incorruptible man -

Bt. Art 5 - act 5 -
? - 107-108

The soul is an incomplete substance - it is a '*per aliquid*' but improperly speaking - The soul is not the man - The man must be generated -

man was his
at - Christ could
still be man
for his death -
could not have died

The matter in which is infused the soul - is properly prepared for it - Evolution is in view of man and terminates when the matter is properly determined for a human soul -

We say the soul is contained in the body - But it is the soul that contains the body for the body is for the sake of the soul - We can be misled by our way of talking of the soul -

Man is substantially one - A whole may be denominated after its principal parts -

James
P. 85, art 1

→ To point out the unity of the human soul + body - The quality of the human intellect depends on the sense of touch - most basic - Sense of touch is the "sensus naturalis communis" -

Not because man is inferior to angels in the order of nature does it mean that

Wynne Reeves

He is inferior in the order of power.

Reading: Schrödinger: What is life? - Anchor - p. 107